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Who should bear the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic? While multilateral institu-
tions are beginning to consider how to distribute them, former U.S. President
Trump and others have suggested suing China for damages. This “lawsuit
approach” draws on a deep-seated conception of international law: States have a
sovereign “right to be left alone”; the only limit to this right is a correlative duty to
avoid harming others. Those harmed can, then, sue for damages. In this view, who
should pay for the costs of the pandemic (and how much) is not a normative ques-
tion about justice, but rather one about factual causes and actuarial calculations.
In this Article, we explore this lawsuit approach—not for its legal viability, but for
its conceptual implications. We exhaustively and critically assess the doctrinal dis-
cussion on China’s international liability for the pandemic while also pointing at
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deep theoretical implications that this novel crisis has for international law more
broadly.
Specifically, we make three novel claims. The first is that the arguments made using
the lawsuit approach (based on the International Health Regulations and the no-
harm principle), when meticulously analyzed under existing international norms,
run into unexpected obstacles. On top of the jurisdictional and evidentiary hurdles
noted by many, we argue that the lawsuit approach faces difficulties stemming from
the lack of deep normative agreement in international law on how to deal with
unprecedented challenges such as COVID-19.
Our second claim draws on the first. Given the need to fill these normative voids,
the lawsuit approach leads back to the global conversation about the allocation of
losses that it carefully tries to avoid. This normative dependence cannot be spared
by analogy with domestic law. Domestic law builds upon thick cultural understand-
ings that fill empty legal concepts (such as “harm” or “causation”), making them
readily operative. International law, however, lacks an equivalent thick culture to
fill these voids and therefore requires complex reconstructions of what states owe to
one another.
Our third claim further extends the foregoing reasoning. The lawsuit approach
relies on international law as a means to achieve corrective justice while denying its
implications for distributive justice. We argue that this is conceptually impossible.
Allocating responsibility for the pandemic implicates inherently distributive con-
cepts: To decide, an adjudicator would need to rely on a pretorian rule detailing
how much effort and expense countries should dedicate to avoiding harm to other
countries. That rule is conceptually distributive, independent of its content. The
misfortunes derived from the pandemic are not conceptually different from the mis-
fortunes of poverty, financial breakdowns, or climate change. Those going down
the road of the lawsuit approach might be unpleasantly surprised by where that
road leads them.
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INTRODUCTION
According to one estimation, the COVID-19 pandemic will cost
the world somewhere between $8.1 and $15.8 trillion.1 Who should
pay for this catastrophe? What does international law have to say
about the distribution of these costs? The international community
seems to have hinted at two distinct approaches to these questions.
One, currently entertained at multilateral forums, speaks of “unity
and solidarity”2 and urges for a “cooperative, global and human
rights-based approach to the crisis.”3 This is an ambitious proposal; it
requires a deep, substantive conversation about our life in common
and about what we owe to each other. Call it the “roundtable
approach.” But it is not the only approach available. Then-U.S.
President Donald Trump and many others have suggested a blunter
alternative: suing China for damages.4 This “lawsuit approach”
whatever its merits, has the advantage of conveying a straightforward
answer to the question of who should bear the burdens of the pan-
demic: those who caused them.5
1 Jeremy Schwab, Fighting COVID-19 Could Cost 500 Times as Much as Pandemic
Prevention Measures, WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2020/08/pandemic-fight-costs-500x-more-than-preventing-one-futurity.
2 António Guterres, Sec’y Gen., United Nations, Secretary-General’s Remarks to High-
Level Event on Financing for Development (May 28, 2020) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s
Remarks], https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-05-28/secretary-generals-
remarks-high-level-event-financing-for-development-scroll-down-for-french-version.
3 Michelle Bachelet, U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Informal Briefing to the
Human Rights Council: COVID Is “a Colossal Test of Leadership” Requiring Coordinated
Action (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=25785&LangID=E.
4 See, e.g., President Donald Trump, Remarks to the 75th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 22, 2020), https://mr.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-
president-trump-to-the-75th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly (“[W]e must
hold accountable the nation which unleashed this plague onto the world: China.”); Jessica
Chen Weiss, Can the U.S. Sue China for Covid-19 Damages? Not Really., WASH. POST
(Apr. 29, 2020, 10:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/29/can-us-sue-
china-covid-19-damages-not-really-this-could-quickly-backfire (providing several expert
opinions on the viability of this approach). Trump is not alone in imagining a compensation
lawsuit. See infra notes 24–41 and accompanying text.
5 As will be clear from the reconstruction below, these approaches are not a perfect
binary, nor mutually exclusive pathways. Negotiations can fall into irrelevance without the
threat of a lawsuit, and lawsuits can be brought to enforce an otherwise successful
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The intuition behind such lawsuit rhetoric is familiar; its utter
commonsensicality has been with us for centuries. Under a classic
approach to international law, heir of our Westphalian past, states
have a sovereign “right to be left alone.”6 Absent specific agreement,
the only limit to this right is a correlative duty to avoid harming other
states.7 When this harmony is disrupted, states can claim compensa-
tion from those who harmed them. Once they are made even, equilib-
rium is restored. The lawsuit approach is therefore not flustered with
uncomfortable normative discussions: Who should pay for the costs of
the pandemic (and how much) is a question of factual causes and actu-
arial calculations.
In this Article, we explore this lawsuit approach to the distribu-
tion of the costs of the pandemic—not because of its chances of suc-
cess, but for its conceptual implications. Specifically, we make three
claims.
The first is that the arguments made using the lawsuit approach,
when analyzed under the existing rules of international law, run into
unexpected obstacles. On top of the jurisdictional and evidentiary
hurdles noted by many,8 we argue that the lawsuit approach faces dif-
ficulties stemming from the lack of normative agreement in interna-
tional law on how to deal with unprecedented situations such as the
COVID-19 pandemic. The International Health Regulations, the main
source of law in this realm, do not clarify the substantive obligations
bearing upon states to prevent pandemics.9 Thus, the lawsuit approach
has two options. First, it can force a causal link between the breach of
a modest procedural guideline and a trillion-dollar compensation
claim. In other words, it can argue that China’s alleged breach of its
obligation to notify the emergence of an outbreak is what caused not
just an acceleration in the spread of the virus, but the entire pandemic.
Second, it can resort to foundational principles of international law,
such as the obligation not to harm other states. In other words, it can
claim, for example, that China’s failure to adopt policies preventing
zoonotic diseases caused transboundary harm. Both strategies, we
claim, are tainted by the same genetic challenge: They have to rely on
agreement. However, they remain rhetorically distinct: actors constantly emphasize one or
the other, and this Article is devoted precisely to the institutional and conceptual
implications of these intuitions. See infra Part IV.
6 Mattias Kumm, Sovereignty and the Right to Be Left Alone: Subsidiarity, Justice-
Sensitive Externalities, and the Proper Domain of the Consent Requirement in International
Law, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 239, 239 (2016) [hereinafter Kumm, The Right to Be
Left Alone].
7 See infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Section II.B.1.
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profound, normative assessments that international law cannot easily
provide. Both the notion of “causation” and the notion of “harm,”
seemingly value-neutral formalities in the lawsuit approach, are inevi-
tably normative—and, thus, much more complex to apply than it
seems at first sight.
Our second claim relies upon the findings of the first. Given the
need to fill these normative voids, the lawsuit approach is led back to
the global, normative conversation about the allocation of losses that
it carefully tried to avoid. In other words, the lawsuit approach also
needs a roundtable. This normative discussion cannot be avoided by
an analogy with tort law, sometimes all too automatically espoused by
exponents of the lawsuit approach.10 Domestic tort law builds upon
thick cultural understandings to fill the empty conceptual vessels of
“harm” and “causation,” making them readily operative. International
law, lacking an equivalent thick culture to fill these voids, requires
complex reconstructions of what states owe to one another—precisely
those that the supporters of the lawsuit approach deem unnecessary.11
Our third and final claim further extends the foregoing reasoning.
The lawsuit approach relies on international law as a means to achieve
corrective justice while denying that it has nonconsensual implications
for distributive justice.12 We argue that this is conceptually impossible:
The general understandings we need in order to allocate responsibility
for the pandemic are inherently distributive. To decide, for example,
whether China violated its duty to prevent transboundary harm, and
therefore caused the pandemic, an adjudicator would need to rely on
a specific pretorian rule detailing how much effort and resources
countries should divert from their national interests into avoiding
harm to other countries. That rule is conceptually distributive,
independent of its content. The misfortunes derived from the pan-
demic are not obviously different, conceptually, from the misfortunes
of poverty, financial breakdowns, or the perilous consequences of cli-
mate change. Those going down the road of the lawsuit approach may
be unpleasantly surprised by where that road leads them.
Our arguments in this Article are not necessarily pessimistic.
International law has faced these hurdles before. Normative indeter-
10 See discussion infra Part IV.
11 See infra Part I for the conceptual reconstruction of the lawsuit approach, and Part
II for an examination of the normative voids faced by international law regarding this
problem.
12 According to Finnis, distributive justice is concerned with “distributing resources,
opportunities, profits and advantages, roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens”
among members of a community, while corrective justice is “the justice that rectifies or
remedies inequalities which arise in dealings . . . between individuals.” JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 166, 178 (1980).
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minations in international law are not necessarily an insurmountable
barrier—arguably, they have not been a critical impediment to its
operation for centuries.13 But perhaps something is changing. These
indeterminacies—while still ultimately solvable—have become more
frequent and more visible. When interactions were scant and sporadic,
states had the time and resources to progressively develop the specific,
idiosyncratic rules required to cut the Gordian knot. This is perhaps
why, in the past, problems of this kind went unproblematized. But the
COVID-19 pandemic has shown that our world is much more interde-
pendent than the lawsuit approach imagines and that problems may
appear before the rules apt to solve them are agreed upon. To recall
Eyal Benvenisti’s famous metaphor, sovereignty is no longer like
owning a large, isolated estate but rather an apartment in a densely
occupied high-rise.14 In apartment buildings, shared losses occur more
frequently and unexpectedly than in large estates: Pipes get clogged,
elevators get stuck, maintenance is needed. Deeper and denser rules
to apportion these losses among tenants are crucial not only to build a
prosperous community but also to secure their peaceful coexistence.
The Article is divided into five parts. In Part I, we reconstruct the
logical structure of the lawsuit approach. We argue that despite the
political fanfare, the lawsuit approach builds upon a classic, common-
sensical notion of international law built around persistent
Westphalian intuitions. Under this approach, states are free to exert
their sovereignty in any way they see fit as long they do not harm
other countries; if they do, they must compensate them.
In Part II, we exhaustively review the legal claims available to the
lawsuit approach proponents and explored by international lawyers in
the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. We then show how each of
these claims fatally encounters a number of legal voids left by a set of
norms that are ill equipped for this challenge. Absent specific consen-
sual rules governing substantive obligations in the prevention of trans-
national infectious diseases, lawsuit approach proponents need to rely
on the broad rules of our Westphalian past, which lack the density and
detail needed to solve this kind of question.
In Part III, we claim that the voids left by these vague rules
should not be mistaken for poor craft; rather, they reflect a funda-
mental legal condition. Giving concrete meaning to terms like “harm”
and “causation”—seemingly empty, value-neutral concepts—neces-
13 Some areas in international law (like investor-state arbitration or human rights law)
have managed to deal with these problems in more workable ways than others. See infra
Section II.C.
14 Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States
to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2013).
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sarily demands deep normative judgments on the social value of goods
and activities. Determining who “caused” the pandemic, and to what
extent we are “harmed” by it, requires dense normative agreements
not reflected in the existing rules of international law.
In Part IV, we explore how to fill these voids. We claim that the
disappointing vagueness of existing international law arises from the
fact that international law, unlike domestic legal systems, cannot draw
these agreements from culturally informed social rules. Therefore, not
finding these normative evaluations ready to use, the lawsuit approach
has no alternative but to promote a global conversation about them.
The need for this kind of global conversation becomes a practical
necessity that even the lawsuit approach cannot escape.
In Part V, we argue that the shared understandings needed by the
lawsuit approach, whatever their shape, would have significant, neces-
sary implications upon the discussion on global distributive justice: In
the end, both conversations hinge on how to make people bear the
costs of their own activities rather than impose them on others.
Blaming someone for the pandemic assumes we know what it takes to
prevent one. The kind of sacrifices required to do so inevitably have
global distributive implications, and the lawsuit approach cannot do
without taking a stand on them.
One cautionary note before proceeding with the argument. Some
may object that entertaining former President Trump’s stretched
recourse to an impossible lawsuit is not worth anyone’s time. Many
may have joined him in a chorus of delusion,15 but the lawsuit
approach remains a bad faith dog-whistle meant to ignite nativist sen-
timent against a perfect enemy.16 This may be true. Still, we believe
rhetorical appeals to law ought generally to be taken seriously. A
leader’s appeal to the “mythic resonances”17 of law might very well be
15 See infra Part I.
16 This seems to be, in any event, the position of the Chinese government: “[Calling for
a lawsuit] is in fact inciting nationalism and hatred against the Chinese.” COMUNICADO DE
LA EMBAJADA DE LA REPÚBLICA POPULAR CHINA EN LA REPÚBLICA DE ECUADOR (May
1, 2020), http://ec.china-embassy.org/esp/zegx/t1775663.htm (translation by author); see
also Owen Bowcott & Angela Giuffrida, From Italian Hotel to a US State, Coronavirus
‘Lawfare’ Takes Hold, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2020, 12:21 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/from-italian-hotel-to-us-state-coronavirus-
lawfare-takes-hold (noting Professor Luis Eslava’s suggestion that proponents of the
lawsuit approach are attempting to use China as a scapegoat); DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS,
GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE 31–32 (2004) [hereinafter FIDLER,
SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE] (suggesting that this is not a
new phenomenon in international health law, but that “Westphalian public health targeted
germ threats considered external to Europe, hence the emphasis on ‘Asiatic diseases’ seen
in the development of international governance on infectious diseases”).
17 Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV.
179, 181 (1984) (“The struggle over what is ‘law’ is then a struggle over which social
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hypocritical, but hypocrisy has a “civilizing force.”18 Once we make an
argument or endorse a norm, sincerely or otherwise, our audiences
have incentives to hold us accountable to them in our successive
public actions. When law is involved, this mechanism is further rein-
forced by the “inner morality of law”19—law’s inherent pull towards
legitimacy and fairness. In what follows, then, we take the lawsuit
approach seriously.
I
RECONSTRUCTING THE LAWSUIT APPROACH
Former President Trump’s suggestion to sue China for the
COVID-19 pandemic has been met with skepticism by most interna-
tional legal scholars.20 However, rushing to dismiss his statement as
yet another of his eccentricities would miss a broader theme in the
international scenario. Whatever the practical viability of such a
claim,21 the idea that China (and perhaps other nations) should be
made responsible for the costs of the pandemic has gained traction in
many quarters. As one goes through the world’s newspapers, varia-
tions of this idea keep surfacing. French President Emmanuel Macron
voiced doubts about China’s responsibility for the pandemic,22 while
patterns can plausibly be coated with a veneer which changes the very nature of that which
it covers up.”).
18 See, e.g., Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 97, 104, 111 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (“[P]ublic speaking is subject to a
consistency constraint. Once a speaker has adopted an impartial argument because it
corresponds to his interest or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from
it when it ceases to serve his needs.” (emphasis omitted)). For one account of the
“‘civilizing’ effect” of hypocrisy in the international public sphere, see Thomas Risse,
“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 22 (2000).
19 For an overview of this concept, see generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 42–46 (1964).
20 For a legal review of the sentiment, see David Fidler, COVID-19 and International
Law: Must China Compensate Countries for the Damage?, JUST SEC. (Mar. 27, 2020)
[hereinafter Fidler, COVID-19 and International Law], https://www.justsecurity.org/69394/
covid-19-and-international-law-must-china-compensate-countries-for-the-damage-
international-health-regulations (“The case for Chinese liability for COVID-19’s
consequences seems less about international law than how the geopolitical rivalry between
the United States and China has shaped the politics of this pandemic.”). For an “exercise of
disciplinary self-examination,” see Francisco-José Quintana & Justina Uriburu, Modest
International Law: COVID-19, International Legal Responses, and Depoliticization, 114
AM. J. INT’L L. 687 (2020) (“[D]ominant approaches to both international legal thought
and practice have . . . conceal[ed] the role of international law in the production of the
conditions that led to the pandemic and the allocation of the suffering that this crisis has
caused.”).
21 See infra Part II.
22 See Victor Mallet & Roula Khalaf, FT Interview: Emmanuel Macron Says It Is Time
to Think the Unthinkable, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/
3ea8d790-7fd1-11ea-8fdb-7ec06edeef84 (“Given these differences, the choices made and
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the Australian government asked for a WHO investigation about the
origin of the virus.23 Individuals around the world have already started
to seek relief before domestic24 and international25 courts. In the
United States, state governments have filed suits against the Chinese
government in federal courts,26 and various members of Congress
have taken concrete steps to remove China’s sovereign immunity
under U.S. law.27 According to opinion surveys collected at the begin-
what China is today, which I respect, let’s not be so naive as to say it’s been much better at
handling this . . . . We don’t know. There are clearly things that have happened that we
don’t know about.”).
23 See Paul Karp & Helen Davidson, China Bristles at Australia’s Call for Investigation
into Coronavirus Origin , GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2020, 1:37 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/australia-defends-plan-to-investigate-china-over-
covid-19-outbreak-as-row-deepens.
24 See Bowcott & Giuffrida, supra note 16 (providing examples of domestic lawsuits
issued against China); see also Mohamed El-Shamaa, Egyptian Lawyer Demands China
Pay $10 Trillion in Coronavirus Damages, ARAB NEWS (Apr. 7, 2020), https://arab.news/
z9kfm.
25 Lawyers in Argentina and India, for example, have tried to report Chinese officials
before the International Criminal Court over their responsibility for the pandemic. See
José Marı́a Costa, Coronavirus: un abogado argentino denunció a la OMS y a China por
“genocidio virósico” y la Justicia pidió informes a Suiza [Coronavirus: An Argentine
Lawyer Files Complaint Against China and the WHO for ‘Viral Genocide’ and the Judiciary
Requests a Report from Switzerland], LA NACIÓN (July 2, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://
www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/coronavirus-argentino-denuncio-oms-al-china-genocidio-
nid2389715; Vijay Tagore, Andheri Lawyer Moves Intl Court Against China over
Coronavirus, MUMBAI MIRROR (Apr. 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://mumbaimirror.
indiatimes.com/coronavirus/news/andheri-lawyer-moves-intl-court-against-china-over-
coronavirus/articleshow/75211989.cms. Not only Chinese officials were reported. A group
claiming to represent over one million Brazilian medical professionals issued a complaint
centered on Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and his handling of the pandemic. See
Tobias Ackermann, COVID-19 at the International Criminal Court, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/covid-19-at-the-international-criminal-court.
26 Missouri’s Attorney General filed a suit against various entities of the Chinese
government seeking “recovery for the enormous loss of life, human suffering, and
economic turmoil experienced by all Missourians from the COVID-19 pandemic that has
disrupted the entire world.” Complaint at 2, Missouri ex rel. Schmitt v. China, No. 20-cv-
00099, 2020 WL 1931343 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2020). Mississippi joined Missouri a few days
later. See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus, and Addressing China’s
Culpability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2020) (testimony
of Lynn Fitch, Att’y Gen.), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Fitch%20Testimony.pdf (“The Coronavirus has killed, caused serious medical harm,
destroyed businesses, and functionally altered the American way of life. We must hold
China accountable now so that they and all other nation-states will know that we will not
allow them to act with impunity . . . .”).
27 Five U.S. members of Congress introduced a bill (the “Stop China-Originated Viral
Infectious Diseases Act of 2020” or the “Stop COVID Act of 2020”), proposing to reform
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to try to force U.S. courts to obviate the
international legal requirement of upholding the sovereign immunity of China. Stop
COVID Act of 2020, H.R. 6444, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/
hr6444/BILLS-116hr6444ih.pdf. The bill has not yet been discussed. The Senate Committee
on the Judiciary held a hearing on “The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus,
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ning of the pandemic, more than half of the people in France,28 the
United States,29 and the United Kingdom30 favor pursuing some form
of accountability from China. In Europe, conservative think-tanks31
and newspapers32 have even calculated the amount to be demanded.
A former Nigerian Cabinet Minister and Vice President of the World
Bank has insisted that China pay reparations to Africa for the dam-
ages caused by the pandemic.33 The Ecuadorian Socialist Party
announced that they would bring China to domestic and international
courts to seek reparation.34 Academics from countries such as
and Addressing China’s Culpability,” where similar intentions were voiced. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus, and Addressing China’s Culpability: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong., at 12:44 (2020), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act-coronavirus-and-
addressing-chinas-culpability (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“I cannot think of a
more compelling idea than to allow individual Americans or groups of Americans to bring
lawsuits against the culprit [of the pandemic], the Chinese government, for the damage
done to their family, to our economy and to the psyche of the nation.”).
28 According to a poll collected in May 2020, 62% of French people would favor an
investigation into the origins of the virus. Thomas Seymat, Sondage?: les Français
favorables à une enquête en Chine sur l’origine du coronavirus [Poll: The French Favor an
Inquiry into China About the Origin of Coronavirus], EURONEWS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://
fr.euronews.com/2020/06/01/sondage-les-francais-favorables-a-une-enquete-en-chine-sur-l-
origine-du-coronavirus.
29 According to a poll conducted in April 2020, 54% of Americans wanted China to pay
for the costs of the pandemic. THE HARRIS POLL, HARRIS POLL COVID-19 SURVEY
(WAVE 6), https://theharrispoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/j17063-QCovid-PropWtd-
Tables-Wave6-6-05-Apr-2020v2.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).
30 According to a poll conducted in April 2020, 71% of Britons wanted their
government to sue China over the damages caused by the pandemic “if it became evident
that the Chinese government breached international law in responding to the initial
outbreak and spread of COVID-19.” Alan Mendoza, Public Attitudes on the Response to
Coronavirus , HENRY JACKSON SOC’Y, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/news/public-
attitudes-on-coronavirus (last visited Jan. 9, 2021).
31 See, e.g., Matthew Henderson, Alan Mendoza, Andrew Foxall, James Rogers & Sam
Armstrong, Coronavirus Compensation? Assessing China’s Potential Culpability and
Avenues of Legal Response , HENRY JACKSON SOC’Y (Apr. 5, 2020), https://
henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/coronaviruscompensation.
32 See, e.g., The Day: German Tabloid Bild Demands China Pay Billions in
Coronavirus Damages, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/the-
day-german-tabloid-bild-demands-china-pay-billions-in-coronavirus-damages/av-53169999.
33 Obiageli Ezekwesili, China Must Pay Reparations to Africa for Its Coronavirus
Failures, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2020/04/16/china-must-pay-reparations-africa-its-coronavirus-failures (“[Africa] must be
accorded damages and liability compensation from China, the rich and powerful country
that failed to transparently and effectively manage this global catastrophe.”).
34 Enrique Ayala Mora & Marcela Arellano Villa, Enjuiciamos a China por daños
causados por la COVID19 [We Sue China for the Damages Caused by COVID-19],
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA ECUATORIANO (Apr. 28, 2020), https://psocialista.ec/boletin-abril-28-
de-2020 (“We will issue a lawsuit [against China] aimed at obtaining compensation for the
loss of lives, illness, economic collapse, social and psychological impact of the plague.”)
(translation by author).
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Canada,35 Colombia,36 France,37 India,38 Finland,39 and the United
States40 have argued that seeking legal redress from China may bring
35 E.g., Errol Patrick Mendes, Marcus Kolga, Sarah Teich, Opinion, China Was in
Violation of International Health Regulations. What Do We Do Now?, MACLEANS (May 3,
2020), https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/china-was-in-violation-of-international-health-
regulations-what-do-we-do-now (“[N]ow is also the critical time to put in place plans to
eventually hold [the Chinese government] to account for the global spread of COVID-
19.”).
36 E.g., Luis Guillermo Vélez Álvarez, Why China Should Compensate Countries for
the Coronavirus Pandemic, PANAM POST (Apr. 28, 2020), https://en.panampost.com/luis-
guillermo-velez/2020/04/28/china-compensate-coronavirus (“[China’s international
responsibility] results from the production of damage as a consequence of a dangerous
legal activity . . . . China has the means to pay . . . .”).
37 E.g., Marie Holzman, Vincent Brossel & Alain Bouc, Covid-19: Qui osera demander
des comptes au régime chinois? [Who Will Dare to Hold the Chinese Regime Accountable?],
LE FIGARO (Apr. 2, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/covid-19-qui-osera-
demander-des-comptes-au-regime-chinois-20200401 (“This pandemic has already posed an
astronomic cost for our societies and our economies. Will the French government, and the
affected countries in general, have the courage to demand that Beijing owns a part of this
cost? . . . We hope so . . . .”) (translation by author); Sandra Szurek, Coronavirus: ‹‹Il est
légitime de poser la question de la responsabilité juridique de la Chine›› [Coronavirus: It Is
Legitimate to Pose the Question About China’s Legal Liability], LE MONDE (May 13, 2020,
6:39 PM), https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/05/13/coronavirus-il-est-legitime-de-
poser-la-question-de-la-responsabilite-juridique-de-la-chine_6039482_3232.html (“There
are legal bases for the eventual liability of China. Among others, one of the first customary
rules in international law . . . is the duty to not cause harm to other states and their
nationals . . . .”) (translation by author).
38 E.g., Vanshaj Jain, Opinion, Can China Be Brought Before an International Court
over Covid Pandemic? Yes, THEPRINT (Apr. 9, 2020), https://theprint.in/opinion/can-china-
be-brought-before-an-international-court-over-covid-pandemic-yes/398218 (“[China] must
be held to account. . . . [A]n international court would be permitted not only to award
compensation for the economic harm . . . but also to compel China to enact legislation
banning [wet] markets to prevent future pandemics.”).
39 E.g., Katja Creutz, China’s Responsibility for the COVID-19 Pandemic: An
International Law Perspective 4 (Finnish Inst. Int’l Affs. Working Paper No. 115, 2020)
(emphasizing the importance of “long term[] discussions on legal responsibility” for China
because, while legal claims are unlikely to succeed, “allegations about wrongful conduct
surely impact China, and will hopefully impel the country to further improve its capacity to
respond to infectious diseases”).
40 E.g., Hearing on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus, and Addressing
China’s Culpability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 9 (2020)
[hereinafter Hearing, Miller] (statement of Russell A. Miller), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Miller%20Testimony1.pdf (“I endorse Congressional and
Executive Branch efforts to consider and seek to account for the Chinese government’s
potential international law responsibility for the substantial transboundary harm its acts
and omissions may have caused in connection with the global coronavirus pandemic.”); E.
Donald Elliott, How to Make China Pay and Prevent the Next Pandemic, AM. SPECTATOR
(May 2, 2020, 12:06 AM), https://spectator.org/how-to-make-china-pay-and-prevent-the-
next-pandemic (“Compensating victims for their injuries and financial losses would be a
good thing to do if we can find a way to get the Chinese to do it.”); John Yoo & Robert J.
Delahunty, How to Make China Pay for COVID-19, HOOVER INST. (Apr. 26, 2020),
https://www.hoover.org/research/how-make-china-pay-covid-19 (“The world must make
China pay in order to create incentives that will force it to improve its behavior.”).
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about benefits. International law blogs and forums all over the world
entertained the idea for months, although in the end most of their
members dismissed it.41
This short survey suggests that the idea that some states should
be compensated by those responsible for the outbreak of the pan-
demic relies on deep-seated intuitions about international law.
Indeed, we argue that Trump’s (and all others’) lawsuit approach to
the pandemic is a plausible reflection of a series of mainstream ideas
about the existing international legal order.42 Under this approach,
states have a “right to be left alone”43 from interference by other
states, as long as they also refrain from interfering with other states.44
If they do—that is, if they impose “externalities”45 on other states, if
they commit a “wrong” affecting them,46 or if they “injure” them47—
they must compensate them.48 A lawsuit, on this account, is an all but
natural means to obtain this compensation; jurisdictional and eviden-
41 See infra notes 128, 174 and accompanying text.
42 Although “[i]t is no easy task to articulate precisely what ‘mainstream’ international
legal theory consists of,” Andrea Bianchi suggests that “it is possible—short of any
epistemological ambition—to point to a certain way of looking at, and thinking about,
international law, which many would easily recognize, if not readily identify themselves
with.” ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT
WAYS OF THINKING 20 (2016). To paraphrase Louis Henkin’s famous quote, this idea of
the “mainstream” thus refers, rather generally, to “international law as it is taught in most
law schools, in most countries, most of the time.” Id. at 22 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, HOW
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979)).
43 Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 239.
44 In the words of James Crawford, echoing Vattel, “sovereign states are to be
considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature, that is to say,
without a common civil law or common institutions; in such a situation they are ‘naturally
equal,’ and inequality of power does not affect this equality.” James Crawford, Sovereignty
as a Legal Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 117
(James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012) (citing EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 35 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008)).
45 See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
46 In the seminal Chorzów Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice
explained that “[i]t is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may
consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured
State have suffered.” Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 17, at 27 (Sept. 13).
47 See JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 54–60 (2013)
(“As to the basic distinction between ‘injury’ and ‘damage,’ it is clear that ‘injury’ involves
the concept of iniuria—that is, infringement of rights or legally protected interests—
whereas the term ‘damage’ refers to material or other loss suffered by the injured state.”).
48 As explained in the oft-cited passage from the PCIJ’s decision in the Chorzów
Factory case, “[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed.” Factory at Chorzów, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 47; see also BIN CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 163
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (“In so far as injury results to others, it means that the
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tiary impediments such as the ones wielded against COVID-19 threats
are but contingent inconveniences waiting to be overcome.
This framework of interstate relations, which constitutes the
background of the lawsuit approach’s reasoning, is logically anterior
to the emergence of obligations via the traditional sources of interna-
tional law, such as treaties or custom. “The legal status of the basic
obligation to avoid significant transboundary harm,” Günther Handl
explains, “is directly related to the sovereign equality of states as the
most axiomatic premise of the international legal order.”49 As an “off-
spring of conceptual reasoning”50 derived from sovereign equality,
rather than a proper source in itself, its validity “does not depend on
confirmation through the usual inductive process of proving cus-
tomary international law.”51 States can then enter into international
agreements to specify their understanding of what is harmful, and they
can commit themselves to other courses of action. But the principle
that states must not harm each other is “the other face of the coin of
sovereignty,”52 and thus a bedrock of the existing international legal
order.53
Mattias Kumm has recently advanced a theoretically sophisti-
cated reconstruction of such a conception, one that permits both the
“interpretation and progressive development of international law.”54
According to Kumm, “[i]t is the point and purpose of international
law to authoritatively resolve” issues that involve “externalities”
author of the act should himself bear the injurious consequences, i.e., take them over by
making reparation.”).
49 Günther Handl, Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Environmental Law: Its
Relevance in the Nuclear Energy Context, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 125, 128 (Rebecca M. Bratspies
& Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
50 Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will,
241 COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 195, 295 (1993) (“The proposition that
no State may disregard the rights and interests of its neighbours is an offspring of
conceptual reasoning. It could not be invalidated by evidence pointing to manifold
departures from the conduct required.”).
51 Handl, supra note 49, at 128; see also JUTTA BRUNNÉE, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum
Non Laedas, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L. (Mar. 2010), https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1607 (“[T]he basic idea
underpinning the maxim is that of a balancing of conflicting sovereign rights. This
balancing requirement arguably inheres in the very notion of sovereign equality, and the
practical as well as conceptual impossibility of absolute territorial sovereignty and
territorial integrity.”).
52 Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Preliminary Rep. on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 247, 258, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 (1982).
53 See also BRUNNÉE, supra note 51, ¶ 17 (describing the obligation as a “foundational
principle of international law”).
54 Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 242.
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posed by a state upon another.55 International law enshrines the prin-
ciple of sovereignty insofar as states do not impose these externalities
on other states.56 Examples of externalities are intuitive: carbon-
dioxide emissions, direct military action, failure to prevent transna-
tional crime, and dangerous nuclear plants close to state borders.57 At
the same time, unless states specifically agree upon it, international
law has no bearing on state policies that, while affecting other coun-
tries, do not constitute externalities, such as raising trade tariffs.58
International law has the authority to prevent states from imposing
externalities, regardless of whether those states have consented to a
particular international norm. When one state nevertheless imposes
an externality on another, it raises the question of compensatory
claims.59
It is easy to see how the lawsuit approach suits the pandemic. The
behemothian and unexpected costs brought about by COVID-19
across the world are (rightly or wrongly) perceived to be “externali-
ties” imposed by China, by act or omission.60 The harm done to the
rest of the world, the lawsuit approach would put it, might be quan-
titatively imprecise, but obviously gigantic.61 The responsibility of
55 Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated
Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 605, 613 (2013) [hereinafter
Kumm, Cosmopolitan Turn].
56 See Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 245 (“The range of questions
over which a state can plausibly claim legitimate authority is limited to questions that do
not raise issues of justice-sensitive externalities.”). Throughout his article, Kumm uses the
expression “justice-sensitive externalities,” clarifying that “externalities” that do not “raise
justice concerns” are of no business of non-consensual international law. Id. at 253–54. We
will refer to Kumm’s “justice-sensitive externalities” simply as “externalities” since, as we
hope our discussion will make clear, all negative externalities raise justice concerns by
definition. See infra Part III.
57 Kumm, Cosmopolitan Turn, supra note 55, at 613.
58 Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 254.
59 Although Kumm does not generally discuss the idea of compensation in this article,
he does point at the possibility of “compensatory claims” for particular instances of
externalities such as colonial impositions. Id. at 255. Nevertheless, under international law,
it is common sense that “[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under
an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby.” G.A. Res. 56/83, annex,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 36(1) (Dec. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter ARSIWA].
60 Some academics have explicitly used the “externalities” framework to analyze the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 40 (arguing that if China
does not bear the costs of the harm caused by their activities, they would be imposing an
“externality” on the rest of the world); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 40 (“The coronavirus
pandemic represents the deadliest form so far of Beijing’s externalization of its economic
and political system.”).
61 For an attempt at a calculation, see Henderson et al., supra note 31. Then-President
Trump talked about “very substantial” damages, and he reportedly expressed interest in
the amount of ten million dollars for every American death caused by the virus. Mark
Mazzetti, Julian E. Barnes, Edward Wong & Adam Goldman, Trump Officials Are Said to
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China might be hard to prove, but this is only a practical concern.62
Once those factual questions have been solved, the answer is clear:
China should make the world even, whatever the costs63—after all,
once we do our math, those are the same costs it imposed on the rest
of the world.
Legal commentators routinely noted that finding a suitable juris-
diction for these potential claims would be hard, if not impossible.64
But in our reconstruction, the lawsuit approach is not necessarily a
Press Spies to Link Virus and Wuhan Labs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/us/politics/trump-administration-intelligence-coronavirus-
china.html.
62 See Hearing, Miller, supra note 40 (generally supporting seeking compensation from
China but warning that “[s]everal elements must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence” before establishing a violation to the no-harm principle).
63 That is, even if paying full compensation comes at the cost of bankruptcy for the
Chinese government. See Martins Paparinskis, A Case Against Crippling Compensation in
International Law of State Responsibility, 83 MOD. L. REV. 1246 (2020) (reviewing the
current international norms permitting “crippling compensation” and calling for their
modification).
64 As a result of the principle of sovereign equality, local courts cannot entertain claims
which have other states as defendants unless they have their consent; the other states have
“sovereign immunity.” For an explanation of the notion of sovereign immunities, see, for
example, JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–102 (2013). Thus, unless China accepts
the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts, U.S. judges will not be allowed, under international
law, to take the cases. See CHIMÈNE KEITNER, Don’t Bother Suing China for Coronavirus,
JUST SEC. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69460/dont-bother-suing-china-for-
coronavirus. International courts and tribunals also need the consent of states to have
jurisdiction to entertain a case. See Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and
Tribunals, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L. (Apr. 2019), https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e35. China, however, has not
presented a unilateral declaration under Article 36.2 of the International Court of Justice,
see Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. OF
JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations (last visited Dec. 17, 2020), and the
International Health Regulations do not have a mandatory compromissory clause, see
World Health Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations (1969) (3d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter WHO, 1969 Regulations]. Some commentators have nevertheless attempted to
find a suitable jurisdiction suggesting states to present claims against China under the
World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution, see Peter Tzeng, Taking China to the
International Court of Justice over COVID-19, EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 2, 2020), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/taking-china-to-the-international-court-of-justice-over-covid-19, under
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, see Haris Huremagic & Fritz Kainz,
COVID-19, China and International Aviation Law: A Ticket to The Hague?, EJIL:TALK!
(July 13, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-china-and-international-aviation-law-a-
ticket-to-the-hague, and even under the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction, see Sandrine De Herdt,
A Reference to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion over COVID-19 Pandemic, EJIL:TALK!
(May 20, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-reference-to-the-icj-for-an-advisory-opinion-
over-covid-19-pandemic. Many of these claims have been received with skepticism by the
international legal community. For a discussion, see Dapo Akande, Gian Luca Burci, Sarah
Nouwen, Marko Milanovic & Philippa Webb, EJIL: The Podcast! WHO Let the Bats Out?,
EJIL:TALK! (May 6, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/ejil-the-podcast-who-let-the-bats-out.
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practical solution, but rather an intellectual framework.65 Even in the
absence of the realistic possibility of a lawsuit, the lawsuit approach
shapes the arguments that pertain to China’s responsibility in the pan-
demic and the amount and forms of compensation to be sought or,
eventually, negotiated.66 John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, for
example, follow an approach based on “externalities”67 but at the
same time mistrust China’s engagement with international law and
courts. Therefore, they suggest, countries should “engage in self-help”
and “deploy their sovereign powers to secure compensation and deter
future wrongdoing.”68 In the absence of a trustworthy forum, Yoo and
Delahunty refrain from advocating for a lawsuit. Yet, they are law-
yers. Their arguments follow a lawsuit logic: Countries should reclaim
from China what China took from them.
The lawsuit approach, however, need not be the only contribu-
tion of international law to the handling of the costs of the pandemic.
There is another way of going about the allocation of costs of COVID-
19—the “roundtable approach.”69 Under the roundtable approach,
65 The conceptual connection between a legal claim and a court adjudicating it runs
very deep: When one can imagine a conflict, one quickly imagines a neutral third party
adjudicating on it; if the conflict can be described in legal terms, one imagines that third
party as a court of law. In fact, according to one leading expert, the “political legitimacy of
courts everywhere” comes from the “overwhelming appeal to common sense” that,
whenever there is a dispute among two parties, there should be a neutral third party to
resolve it. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1
(1981). When it comes to international law, one also arguably thinks of one’s arguments as
if one were to defend them before an imaginary international court. Ronald Dworkin, A
New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 1, 13–14 (2013) (proposing a
mental experiment of an international court in which cases can be easily adjudicated and
enforced as a condition for “fram[ing] tractable question[s] of [international] political
morality”).
66 Legal discourse can shape the arguments brought to the table of political
negotiation, both through the threat of a potentially successful lawsuit and through the
legitimizing language of law. See Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade? The Roles of
International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 61, 64–65 (2007)
(“[T]he influence of legal rules does not turn solely on the possibility of third-party
enforcement; international law’s influence also derives from the normative force of the
ideas it embodies and its capacity to legitimize negotiated outcomes in the eyes of other
international actors and domestic constituencies.”). For a version of this mechanism
applied to the COVID-19 pandemic by a supporter of the lawsuit approach, see Hearing,
Miller, supra note 40, at 10 (“[C]reating the possibility for civil law remedies against
foreign sovereigns in relation to the global coronavirus pandemic [can work as] a means . . .
for leveraging interstate negotiations concerned with establishing the Chinese
government’s responsibility and settling on potential remedies.”).
67 Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 40 (“The coronavirus pandemic represents the
deadliest form so far of Beijing’s externalization of its economic and political system.”).
68 Id.
69 Our “lawsuit approach” and “roundtable approach” parallel, to some extent,
Francisco-José Quintana and Justina Uriburu’s “modest” and “counterpoint” approaches
to international law. See Quintana & Uriburu, supra note 20, at 694–95. The former
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countries openly discuss the best way to distribute the burdens of the
pandemic, looking not only at responsibility for bringing it about but
also, and most importantly, at how the pandemic affects each of
them.70 In the lawsuit approach, rich countries arguably lose more
than developing countries (that is, they have more to lose in the first
place) and are therefore entitled to larger compensation sums. The
roundtable approach would acknowledge that rich countries lose
more, but it would also be sensitive to the complexity of the situa-
tion—for example, that they are also better prepared to secure the
basic needs of their populations. The roundtable approach is not nec-
essarily bound by either the deeds nor the acts of the past.71 Thus, it
allows for innovative proposals to deal with the effects of the pan-
demic, from “linking the fight against the virus to questions such as
the abolition of ‘Third World’ debt”72 to the replacement of voluntary
(state and private) contributions with the “collective and mandatory
attempts to depoliticize the discussion and to secure the application of the existing legal
framework, while the latter attempts innovative ideas to try to come out from the
pandemic with an international legal order which is less unjust than the one which
previously existed. See id. at 695. Similarly, David Fidler has proposed leaving aside
discussions about state responsibility and rather advocating for a “review approach” which
“considers matters important to substantive justice by identifying changes to improve
future health outcomes (e.g., strengthening surveillance and response capacities) and
distribute more equitably the resources needed for achieving better health outcomes (e.g.,
increasing health assistance to low-income countries).” David P. Fidler, Pandemic
Reparations and Justice in Global Health Governance, THINK GLOB. HEALTH (May 7,
2020), https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/pandemic-reparations-and-justice-global-
health-governance.
70 One prominent example of this approach was an event convened at the United
Nations by the governments of Canada and Jamaica, as well as the U.N. itself, entitled the
“High-Level Event on Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond.”
There, the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, stated, “We need to respond with unity
and solidarity. A key aspect of solidarity is financial support. I welcome the swift actions
that have already been taken . . . . But many developing countries lack the means to fight
the pandemic, and to invest in recovery.” Secretary-General’s Remarks, supra note 2; see
also The High-Level Event on Financing for Development in the Era of COVID-19 and
Beyond, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus/financing-development-
statements (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (providing statements from various world leaders
advocating for what we would consider a roundtable approach).
71 For a good example of the contrast between the lawsuit and the roundtable
approaches, see Johanna Aleria P. Lorenzo, To Sue or Not to Sue: Enforcing the Obligation
to Notify Under the International Health Regulations, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (June 4, 2020),
https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/articles/to-sue-or-not-to-sue (“Rules-based dispute
settlement systems . . . depoliticize the implementation of international legal
obligations. . . . [Instead], global health governance requires an international organization
with reinforced independence, expertise, and credibility and more clearly-delineated
functions that include serving as an ‘information clearinghouse,’ i.e. facilitating
international cooperation . . . .”).
72 Adam Hanieh, This Is a Global Pandemic – Let’s Treat It as Such, VERSO (Mar. 27,
2020), https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4623-this-is-a-global-pandemic-let-s-treat-it-as-
such.
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pooling of funds.”73 In sum, the roundtable approach leads to a dense,
global conversation about the costs and rewards of our life in
common.
The lawsuit approach does not necessarily reject these conversa-
tions, but it does not regard them as a matter of legal obligation. It
contends that international law in its existing form does not impose
distributive-justice obligations beyond those entailed by the repara-
tion of wrongful harms.74 The lawsuit approach fits well with the polit-
ical sensitivities of unilateralists. A lawsuit appears to be prophylactic;
it requires neither uncomfortable conversations about value nor pro-
miscuous distributive reproaches.75 It is, perhaps, the approach most
compatible with Trump’s “instincts and impulses” towards the interna-
tional agenda: “Wherever possible, disengage from globalism. Under-
mine international institutions and resign from global leadership.”76
II
THE LAWSUIT APPROACH, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC: OLD TOOLS FOR NEW
PROBLEMS
From the perspective of international law, the lawsuit approach
looks prima facie plausible, at least if the apparent jurisdictional and
evidentiary obstacles are overcome. According to the narrative, the
acts and omissions of some states—most prominently, China—have
generated immense, unjustifiable burdens upon some other states.
These states have suffered an “injury,” and they are thus entitled to
request that these damages are compensated.
73 Celine Tan, International Public Finance and COVID-19: A New Architecture Is
Urgently Needed, MEDIUM (Apr. 17, 2020), https://medium.com/iel-collective/international-
public-finance-and-covid-19-a-new-architecture-is-urgently-needed-6a364c43141e. For a
review of measures that could fit a “roundtable approach” to COVID-19 in international
law, see, for example, the description of “counterpoint international law” in Quintana &
Uriburu, supra note 20, at 695–96.
74 See Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 255 (“Strong cosmopolitan
redistributive theories of social justice that place no significance on the fact that the world
is divided up into states are difficult to square with the premises of the argument presented
here.”). For a review and critical discussion of these views, see JOHN LINARELLI, MARGOT
E. SALOMON & MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CONFRONTATIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 38–77 (2018).
75 The ideal type we label as the “lawsuit approach” reconstructs a widely shared
intuition (applicable to international law and to daily life): “you break it, you fix it.” This,
of course, is not common to all lawsuits (neither in international law, nor beyond), which
might point to a wider range of goals: punishment, retribution, vindication, distribution,
etc.
76 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5
(2019).
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The problem, however, is that international law does not have a
clear regulation of what constitutes an “injury” in the context of a
pandemic, or of how much compensation is due in these kinds of sce-
narios. In the following sections, we first explore the evolution of the
international legal tools developed to deal with infectious diseases.
We show that even though international law has long regulated state
responses to transboundary pathogens, it has not specified which obli-
gations placed upon states in order to prevent pandemics such as
COVID-19 are binding. Thus, we argue second that the proponents of
the lawsuit approach have had to structure their legal claims by refer-
ence to either broad, vague principles of international law, or to spe-
cific rules with complicated causal connections to the damage alleged.
Finally, we explain that these problems are quite systemic in interna-
tional law but emerge unevenly across different regimes, thanks to
states’ incentives to resolve certain issues and not others.
A. International Law and Infectious Diseases
Unfortunately for the inter-state system, pathogens do not recog-
nize borders.77 This is not really a new phenomenon, as it “applies to
the spread of infectious diseases in every time period of human his-
tory.”78 Pathogens travelled transnationally during the Black Death of
the fourteenth century, the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, and in
recent times, the “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (SARS),
H1N1, and ebola epidemics.79 It should not be surprising, then, that
international law has long been concerned with the pernicious effects
of transnational infectious diseases, despite some neglect toward the
topic in the specialized literature.80
The first International Sanitary Conference, which took place in
Paris in 1851, was followed by a series of bilateral and multilateral
treaties dealing with the transnational dimensions of diseases such as
77 See FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra




80 See David P. Fidler, Public Health and International Law: The Impact of Infectious
Diseases on the Formation of International Legal Regimes, 1800–2000, in PLAGUES AND
POLITICS: INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY 262, 262 (Andrew T. Price-
Smith ed., 2001) [hereinafter Fidler, Public Health and International Law] (“Prior to the
1990s, the role of international law in efforts by states to control and prevent infectious
diseases has not been frequently analysed by international lawyers or international
relations scholars. International lawyers and international relations specialists historically
generated a persistent lack of interest in public health issues.”).
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cholera, yellow fever, diphtheria, and dengue.81 These agreements,
however, were not designed to force states to take preventive mea-
sures to avoid the spread of these maladies. Instead, they were meant
to “mitigate the frictions infectious diseases caused for state interac-
tions, primarily trade and travel.”82 The core preoccupation of
Westphalian international law in relation to these illnesses was the
transnational disruptions caused by governmental responses, not the
damage caused by the diseases themselves. The system tacitly
assumed, first, that the spread of disease should not halt globalization
(it could only tame it, temporarily) and, second, that each state was
responsible for taking its own measures to protect its population.83
The creation of the World Health Organization (WHO), in 1948,
and the adoption of the International Health Regulations (IHR)
(called, until 1967, “International Sanitary Regulations”) did not radi-
cally change this outlook.84 The WHO Constitution did acknowledge
the human right to health85 and the need for international cooperation
in relation to health issues.86 But until 2005, the IHR, the binding
instrument dealing with these matters,87 held that its purpose con-
81 See FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra
note 16, at 26–32 (providing a review of such treaties); see also Fidler, Public Health and
International Law, supra note 80, at 263–69.
82 FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16,
at 28–29 (“Historians of these efforts stress that a driving force behind the development of
an international governance framework for infectious diseases was the increasing drag that
national quarantine measures were creating for international trade.”).
83 See id. at 29–30 (arguing that the development of international law on the subject
followed the “non-intervention principle of the Westphalian system,” focusing on trade
and travel rather than public health, even where governments understood the economic
benefits that such public health regulation would bring).
84 See id. at 32 (“The structure, principles, and politics of Westphalian public health
governance all appear in the IHR . . . [and] are the direct progeny of the approach to
infectious disease cooperation developed since the mid-nineteenth century.”).
85 “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political
belief, economic or social condition.” Constitution of the World Health Organization, July
22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 186, 186 [hereinafter WHO Constitution].
86 “The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and
is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States.” Id. The WHO
Constitution imposes no duty “to control infectious diseases or to cooperate with the
Organization on infectious disease problems. The only concrete duties WHO member
states have agreed to undertake in accepting the WHO Constitution are to pay their
financial assessments and submit certain general reports to WHO . . . .” FIDLER, SARS,
GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16, at 110.
87 One of the functions of the WHO, according to Article 2(k) of its Constitution, is “to
propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make recommendations with
respect to international health matters . . . .” WHO Constitution, supra note 85, at 188.
Article 21 of the same instrument specifies that the Health Assembly, the main organ of
the Organization, has the “authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and
quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international
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sisted in ensuring “the maximum security against the international
spread of disease with minimal interference with world traffic.”88 For
this purpose, it imposed two kinds of obligations upon member states:
first, an obligation to notify the WHO of outbreaks taking place
within their territories;89 and second, a number of obligations relating
to the public health capabilities states should have at airports and
ports, “the gateways of Westphalian state interaction through trade
and travel.”90 This focus on airports and ports contrasted “with the
absence of any other rules on national public health capabilities . . .
consistent with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.”91
There is widespread agreement in the literature that the IHR
system failed comprehensively during the twentieth century.92 States
did not comply with their notification obligations “out of fear of the
economic costs they would suffer when countries learned of and
reacted to the outbreaks.”93 The rules on trade and travel measures
spread of disease . . . .” Id. at 192. According to Article 22, these regulations “shall come
into force for all Members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health
Assembly except for such Members . . . as may notify the Director-General of rejection or
reservations within the period stated in the notice.” Id. at 193. The International Health
Regulations were explicitly adopted under the authority given by these articles to the
Health Assembly. WHO, 1969 Regulations, supra 64, at 5. Thus, they are binding upon
member states.
88 WHO, 1969 Regulations, supra 64, at 5; see also FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND
THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16, at 33 (explaining how this objective
reflects Westphalian tenets of governance); Chiara Giorgetti, International Health
Emergencies in Failed and Failing States, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1347, 1363–67 (2013)
(discussing the consolidation of previous agreements into the IHR to make it more
binding, the several revisions meant to improve knowledge on epidemic diseases, and still
the inability of the IHR to prove effective). The new wording goes in a similar direction,
but it is more subtle: “The purpose and scope of [these Regulations] are ‘to prevent,
protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of
disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which
avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.’” World Health
Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations (2005), at 1 (3d ed. 2016)
[hereinafter WHO, 2005 Regulations].
89 FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16,
at 33–34.
90 Id. at 34.
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., id. at 35 (claiming that “[t]he IHR constitute . . . a significant failure for
Westphalian public health”); David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New
International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and
Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2006) (“[T]he Regulations did not provide an
effective framework for addressing the international spread of disease.”); Giorgetti, supra
note 88, at 1366 (“[D]espite its great potential, IHR failed to provide a general effective
mechanism to assist the international community in addressing global health emergencies
and controlling the spread of disease.”); SARA E. DAVIES, CONTAINING CONTAGION: THE
POLITICS OF DISEASE OUTBREAKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 14–15 (2019).
93 FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16,
at 35.
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were not observed, either.94 But perhaps the most significant failure
was embedded in the design of the IHR themselves: The regulations
focused on a number of specific diseases, instead of providing an open
definition of the kind of threats they were meant to assess.95 Fre-
quently, this rendered them irrelevant, or even an obstacle, to the
handling of the most severe crises such as HIV/AIDS.96
In 2005, after the global difficulties in handling the SARS epi-
demic, the IHR were significantly refurbished.97 Of those reforms,
three are particularly relevant. First, the IHR now apply to any dis-
ease, “irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present
significant harm to humans.”98 It is no longer the case that if a disease
is not in the list, the Regulations do not apply to it. Second, the new
IHR expand the obligation to notify to include “all events which may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern within
its territory.”99 Such a public health emergency is in turn defined as
“an extraordinary event which is determined . . . (i) to constitute a
public health risk to other States through the international spread of
disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international
response.”100 This expansion in the obligation to notify reflects, as one
commentator put it, a “growing recognition that sovereigns have
responsibilities to protect persons . . . and contain the risk of disaster
hazards spreading beyond territorial borders.”101 Third, and finally,
the IHR now require states to “develop, strengthen and maintain”
surveillance and response capacities, not just in ports of entry and exit,
but throughout their territory.102 The Regulations provide some speci-
fications in relation to these capacities, which are mostly procedural:
States must be able to “detect,”103 “report,”104 “confirm the status,”105
94 See id.
95 See id. at 36.
96 See id. at 36–39.
97 Fidler & Gostin, supra note 92, at 85.
98 WHO, 2005 Regulations, supra note 88, at 7; see also Fidler & Gostin, supra note 92,
at 87 (“This ‘all risks’ approach embodies an important conceptual shift concerning public
health’s role in the IHR. Trade calculations determined the old IHR’s scope, but risks to
human health define the new IHR’s scope. The result is a set of rules with more public
health legitimacy, flexibility, and adaptability.”).
99 WHO, 2005 Regulations, supra note 88, at 12.
100 Id. at 9.
101 Sara E. Davies, A Responsibility to Protect Persons in the Event of Natural Disasters,
in PROTECTING THE DISPLACED: DEEPENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 163, 180
(Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2010).
102 WHO, 2005 Regulations, supra note 88, at 11.
103 Id. at 40 (“[T]o detect events involving disease or death above expected levels for the
particular time and place in all areas within the territory of the State Party.”).
104 Id. (“[T]o report all available essential information immediately to the appropriate
level of healthcare response . . . [including] clinical descriptions, laboratory results, sources
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“assess,”106 “determine,”107 etc. The only substantive ability men-
tioned within these “core capacity requirements”108 is that needed “to
implement preliminary control measures immediately”109 upon an
outbreak being detected.
The new IHR say nothing, then, of the kinds of sacrifices states
must make in order to prevent the emergence of infectious diseases
and their expansion to other states. Despite their “transformational
nature,”110 the new Regulations did not “cut through the tangled knot
of very hard political, economic, scientific, and public health choices
governments must make to address this public health emergency of
international concern.”111 The new IHR did impose some further obli-
gations upon states in relation to what happens in their territories
(and not just in their ports of entry), but their main goal was prepared-
ness, not prevention.112 The Regulations failed “to adopt an anticipa-
tory approach,”113 and they do not “require States [to] go on the
offensive against the factors that lead to disease emergence and
spread. The new IHR are rules for global disease triage rather than
global disease prevention.”114
and type of risk, numbers of human cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of the
disease and the health measures employed.”).
105 Id. (“[T]o confirm the status of reported events and to support or implement
additional control measures.”).
106 Id. at 41 (“[T]o assess all reports of urgent events within 48 hours.”).
107 Id. (“[T]o determine rapidly the control measures required to prevent domestic and
international spread.”).
108 Id. at 40–42.
109 Id. at 40.
110 Fidler & Gostin, supra note 92, at 93. According to Fidler and Gostin, “[t]he new
IHR contain an international legal regime unprecedented in the history of the relationship
between international law and public health.” Id. The Regulations now “provide a
framework that supports not only improved international cooperation on health but also
the strengthening of national health systems, producing more robust health governance
horizontally among states and vertically within them.” Id.
111 Fidler & Gostin, supra note 92, at 93; see also Patricia L. Farnese, The Prevention
Imperative: International Health and Environmental Governance Responses to Emerging
Zoonotic Diseases, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 285, 287 (2014) (emphasizing the complexity of
disease outbreaks and of their prevention). Some prominent zoonotic diseases are HIV,
Ebola, and SARS. See id. at 287.
112 See David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health
Security: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 325, 389 (2005)
[hereinafter Fidler, Global Health Security] (suggesting that “[t]he strategy of global health
security is essentially a defensive, reactive strategy”).
113 Farnese, supra note 111, at 303.
114 Fidler, Global Health Security, supra note 112, at 389. The 2005 version of the
Regulations did not take any further steps to enhance compliance, either. They do not
include mandatory dispute-settlement provisions, or even review mechanisms. All that the
IHR establish is that, in the event of a dispute, states have an obligation to negotiate and
that they may agree to submit it to the WHO Director-General, to arbitration, or to any
other means of their choice. See WHO, 2005 Regulations, supra note 88, at 34–35.
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There may be several reasons why states opted not to specify the
courses of action needed to prevent future pandemics and instead
decided to focus on being prepared in case they arrived. Most promi-
nently, this decision may be related to the significant costs associated
with an effective strategy of prevention.115 Zoonotic diseases, which
account for approximately seventy percent of emerging infectious dis-
eases, are usually the result of “human alteration of the natural
world,”116 including activities as prominent and widespread as defor-
estation, urbanization, irrigation, industrial stockbreeding, and exces-
sive use of antibiotics.117 Reaching a specific agreement on reforms to
these practices would have been very difficult; reaching a general
agreement on being ready in case something happened was much
easier. As explained by Martti Koskenniemi in a different context,
states sometimes resort to these solutions because “[a]greement on
substantive law requires more of a consensus about political value
than agreeing upon procedure. Procedural solutions, combined with
generally formulated calls for equitable balancing, do not prejudice
any State’s substantive policy or its view about the limits of its own
freedom of action.”118 The problem, of course, is that avoiding the
discussion of these issues is very different from finding a solution. The
world would learn this lesson very soon.
B. Three Attempts at Distributing the Costs of the Pandemic by
Way of International Law
Not surprisingly, given the lack of specific agreements on the
question of prevention and the continued increase in international
trade and travel, the new IHR were quickly put to test by a new pan-
Although formally binding, the Regulations are, therefore, “a comparatively weak
international instrument.” DAVIES, supra note 92, at 32. The lack of an “external review
process for state compliance . . . permits states to take it less seriously compared to other
instruments that have periodic reporting requirements.” Id.
115 According to one estimate, for example, “significantly reducing transmission of new
diseases from tropical forests would cost, globally, between $22.2 and $30.7 billion each
year.” Schwab, supra note 1.
116 Farnese, supra note 111, at 287. The Regulations have been specifically criticized for
their lack of attention to zoonotic diseases: “The contribution of wildlife to disease
emergence is widely acknowledged, yet the international response is overwhelmingly
concentrated on detecting and responding to diseases despite repeated calls to address the
root cause of [emerging zoonotic diseases].” Id. at 303; see also Lawrence O. Gostin &
Rebecca Katz, The International Health Regulations: The Governing Framework for Global
Health Security, 94 MILBANK Q. 264, 290 (2016) (claiming that “the regulations fail to
govern multisectoral engagement and coordination on zoonotic diseases or the laboratory
and surveillance capacities required to identify disease in animals”).
117 See Farnese, supra note 111, at 287–88.
118 Martti Koskenniemi, Peaceful Settlement of Environmental Disputes, 60 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 73, 74 (1991).
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demic. In 2009, the H1N1 “swine flu” was the first disease declared to
be a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern,” according
to the new Regulations.119 It is unclear where the disease originated,
but the virus was first detected in the United States in the spring of
2009, and it quickly spread throughout the world.120 After the pan-
demic ended, the WHO set up a committee to review the organiza-
tion’s role in the fight against the virus. The body noted the positive
impact of some of the revisions to the IHR but also pointed to its
many shortcomings, the most important of which was “the lack of
enforceable sanctions.”121 The idea of suing states for their responsi-
bility in the pandemic was not entertained back then, probably thanks
to the rapid discovery of effective antivirals and the limited death toll
of the disease (only 18,500 confirmed deaths globally).122 “We were
lucky this time,” the chair of the WHO committee stated, “but, as the
report concludes, the world is ill-prepared for a severe pandemic or
for any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health
emergency.”123
Such an emergency came sooner than expected and with a scope,
depth, and duration that was not comparable to the H1N1 pan-
demic—or to any other recent disease, for that matter.124 This pan-
demic, as we all sadly know, is in many ways unprecedented. COVID-
19 was not limited to a specific region: It reached all corners of the
world, causing loss of life, economic devastation, and pervasive dis-
ruption. COVID-19 did not finish after a few months; its real end date
is not even in sight. Finally, another significant difference between
COVID-19 and most of its predecessors, one which may explain the
attractiveness of the lawsuit approach, is that it appears to have a clear
geographical origin, one that happens to touch on an already delicate
political tension between the world’s two largest economies.
119 World Health Org. [WHO] Rev. Comm’n on the Functioning of the Int’l Health
Reguls. (2005) and on Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) 2009, Implementation of the
International Health Regulations (2005), at 8, WHO Doc. A64/10 (2011) [hereinafter
Implementation of the IHR (2005)].
120 See 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html (last
visited June 11, 2019).
121 Implementation of the IHR (2005), supra note 119, at 13.
122 See id. at 49.
123 Id. at 7.
124 “The SARS outbreak was the first infectious disease epidemic since HIV/AIDS to
pose a truly global threat.” FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF
DISEASE, supra, note 16, at 15. Yet the 2002–04 SARS outbreak only infected about 8,000
people and killed fewer than 1,000. See Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of
Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 24, 2015),
https://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en.
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These differences may explain why, in this scenario, international
lawyers did thoroughly explore the potential claims that could be
made if a lawsuit approach were to be taken125—something most of
them had not done in previous pandemics.126 Specifically, three claims
were put forward: first, that China committed an internationally
wrongful act by omitting to notify the WHO of the outbreak in accor-
dance with the IHR; second, that China and others violated their gen-
eral obligation to prevent transboundary harm; and third, that China
and other states could be liable for licit but hazardous activities occur-
ring within their territories.
1. Violation of the International Health Regulations
Most of the arguments for holding China responsible for the pan-
demic point to an alleged breach of its obligation to promptly notify of
“all events which may constitute a public health emergency of interna-
tional concern” under Article 6 of the IHR.127 Since this body of rules
is binding upon members of the WHO, including China, their viola-
125 Indeed, some have argued that the international law profession has paid excessive
attention to questions of state responsibility in relation to COVID-19, leaving aside more
important, and systemic, concerns that better explain the emergence of this crisis (and
others). See Quintana & Uriburu, supra note 20, at 694–96.
126 The notable exception was a Student Note. Joshua D. Reader, Note, The Case
Against China: Establishing International Liability for China’s Response to the 2002-2003
SARS Epidemic, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 519 (2005). However, his claim was met with some
skepticism by mainstream scholarship, which concluded that “[i]n the absence of an
international legal obligation that applie[d] to its actions directly on SARS, China’s
behavior [could not] be considered legally wrongful . . . given the configuration of
international law in place at the time . . . .” FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16, at 110.
127 WHO, 2005 Regulations, supra note 88, at 12; see, e.g., James Kraska, China Is
Legally Responsible for COVID-19 Damage and Claims Could Be in the Trillions, WAR ON
THE ROCKS (Mar. 23, 2020), https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/china-is-legally-
responsible-for-covid-19-damage-and-claims-could-be-in-the-trillions (“China’s failure to
provide open and transparent information to WHO is . . . [a] breach of a legal duty that
China owed to other states under international law, and for which injured states—now
numbering some 150 nations—may seek a legal remedy.”); Antonio Coco & Talita de
Souza Dias, Prevent, Respond, Cooperate: States’ Due Diligence Duties Vis-à-Vis the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 218, 229–30 (2020)
(“[T]here are reports that local doctors had warned public authorities of a surge of
unknown ‘viral pneumonia’ cases in mid-December 2019 . . . . Yet China only notified the
local WHO Country Office . . . on 31 December 2019.”); Romel Regalado Bagares, China,
International Law, and COVID-19, INQUIRER (Mar. 22, 2020, 4:20 AM), https://
opinion.inquirer.net/128226/china-international-law-and-covid-19 (“Under the law on state
responsibility, China’s suppression of crucial information about COVID-19 is a violation of
its international obligations under the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) . . . .”);
Lorenzo, supra note 71 (“[B]elated notification and/or omission of critical information
constitute a breach of the obligation to notify under Article 6 of the [IHR]. This breach
obliges China to repair the harms . . . .”).
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tion gives rise to state responsibility128 and, thus, to an obligation to
“wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had
not been committed.”129 This can be done in a number of ways. One
way consists of compensating “any financially assessable damage
including loss of profits” to those injured,130 a claim which in the case
of COVID-19 “could be in the trillions.”131
Leaving complex evidentiary issues aside, one prominent
problem of this argument, as David Fidler notes, lies in the question of
causation—that is, the difficult task of “separating what damage is
attributable to China’s delayed reporting and what harms arose
because other governments botched their responses to COVID-19.”132
As we explored in the previous section, there are no specific, consent-
based rules of international law governing causation of harm in the
context of pandemics. The IHR only establish procedural obligations
(aiming at preparedness, not even at prevention) and provide no guid-
ance on causation.133
128 For this position, see, for example, Valerio Mazzuoli, State Responsibility and
COVID-19: Bringing China to the International Court of Justice?, INT’L L. BLOG (May 15,
2020), https://internationallaw.blog/2020/05/15/state-responsibility-and-covid-19-bringing-
china-to-the-international-court-of-justice (arguing that the wording of the IHR
obligations “in the best style [of] hard law . . . is direct and imperative”) (emphasis
omitted); Lorenzo, supra note 71 (“[ARSIWA] support the hypothetical plaintiffs’
theory.”). For a contrary position, see, for example, Rebecca Bratspies, Trail Smelter
Arbitration Offers Little Guidance for COVID-19 Suits Against China, JUST SEC. (July 14,
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71363/the-trail-smelter-arbitration-offers-little-
guidance-for-the-covid-19-world-on-attempts-to-sue-china (“The WHO regulations
themselves provide no remedy for State breach. More fundamentally, it is not clear that
they constitute law for purposes of creating a state duty under the Draft Articles, which
generally focus on treaty obligations.”).
129 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13); see also ARSIWA, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 1 (“The responsible State is under
an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act.”).
130 ARSIWA, supra note 59, art. 36, ¶ 1. However, the ICJ has been quite modest in its
calls for compensation for procedural obligations of this kind, preferring the much more
symbolic option of satisfaction, i.e. “an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of
regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.” Id. art. 37; see Lorenzo, supra
note 71 (explaining that two-thirds of the Court’s awards are non-compensatory).
131 Kraska, supra note 127.
132 Fidler, COVID-19 and International Law, supra note 20; see also Lorenzo, supra
note 71 (“The duty to compensate, however, is contingent on the demonstration of a
violation-injury causation. . . . If it can be shown that China’s purported concealment . . .
necessitated the restrictive measures presently causing adverse socioeconomic effects, then
one can plausibly argue that its failure to notify triggered the obligation to pay
compensation.”).
133 See supra Section II.A; see also Fidler, COVID-19 and International Law, supra note
20 (“None of the treaties addressing the international spread of infectious diseases dating
back to the nineteenth century have rules requiring payment of compensation for damage
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The general rules on state responsibility are also notably vague
on the matter.134 The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles
on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)
hold that “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act.”135 However, the Commission explicitly evaded a precise defini-
tion of causation: It noted that “[i]n international as in national law,
the question of remoteness of damage ‘is not a part of the law which
can be satisfactorily solved by search for a single verbal formula.’”136
Indeed, the caselaw on this matter has been “haphazard and unprinci-
pled.”137 International tribunals have solved questions of causation
referring “rather randomly”138 to standards as varied as “direct
cause,”139 “proximate cause,”140 “certain cause,”141 or “foreseeable
in other countries associated with violations of treaty rules. The leading contemporary
treaty, the [IHR], has no provisions on this issue.”). The problem of causation was also
tricky for those arguing for China’s responsibility in the context of SARS: “It is impossible
to assert that if China had honestly and promptly reported the Guangdong SARS outbreak
to WHO then the global outbreak would not have occurred. However, . . . China’s cover-
up actively prevented other nations from taking adequate precautions at their borders . . .
[and] was a proximate cause of the global outbreak.” Reader, supra note 126, at 562.
134 See Vitalius Tumonis, The Complications of Conciliatory Judicial Reasoning:
Causation Standards and Underlying Policies of State Responsibility, 11 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L
L. 135, 137 (2011) (“Scholarly literature on the causation standards is scant. . . . By and
large, the International Law Commission also neglected causation in its codification of
State responsibility. Overall, causation is at the vanishing point of the literature on State
responsibility.”); Ilias Plakokefalos, Causation in the Law of State Responsibility and the
Problem of Overdetermination: In Search of Clarity, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 471, 471–73 (2015)
(arguing that “the concept of causation in international law is unclear, especially in relation
to overdetermination, and it must be clarified” and that “the treatment of causal concepts
in international law is mostly rudimentary”).
135 ARSIWA, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Article 36, paragraph 1, in
turn, holds that “[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby . . . .” Id. art. 36(a) (emphasis
added).
136 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,
with Commentaries, [2001] 2(2) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/
Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm 2001] (quoting P.S. ATIYAH,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 466 (5th ed. 1995)); see also Tumonis,
supra note 134, at 142 (explaining the meaning of this phrase, and holding that as a result
of it, “different causation tests might be applicable to different causes of action”).
137 Plakokefalos, supra note 134, at 473.
138 Id. at 491 (“[I]nternational adjudicatory bodies follow different approaches in
dealing with similar issues. They employ causal tests rather randomly . . . . Even when they
have the benefit of being guided by specific procedural rules . . . they often stray and make
general proclamations on international causal standards that are not supported in
practice.”).
139 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 462
(Feb. 26) (describing the necessity of a “sufficiently direct . . . causal nexus”); see also
Tumonis, supra note 134, at 138–39 (discussing the direct cause standard).
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cause,”142 often being “remarkably evasive as to the details of their
analysis.”143
The question is particularly complex in cases of overdetermina-
tion—that is, those in which there may be concomitant or concurrent
causation, such as with COVID-19.144 In its commentary to the
ARSIWA, the ILC attempted to find a middle ground between the
divergent positions held by the two special rapporteurs that worked
on the project.145 For Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, in cases of concurrent
causation, the liability of the state should be proportionally
reduced.146 For James Crawford, there should be no partial reduction
of a state’s liability in cases of causal concurrence.147 The commentary
explains that “unless some part of the injury can be shown to be sever-
able in causal terms from that attributed to the responsible State, the
latter is held responsible for all the consequences, not being too
remote, of its wrongful conduct.”148
140 Mixed Claims Comm’n, U.S. & Ger., Administrative Decision No. II: Dealing with
the Functions of the Commission and Announcing Fundamental Rules of Decision, 18 AM.
J. INT’L L. 177, 183 (1924) (emphasis omitted) (discussing the concept of proximate cause);
Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. and Others (U.S. v. Ger.) (Life-Ins. Claims), 7 R.I.A.A. 91,
113 (1924) (applying “proximate cause” doctrine).
141 See Application of the Convention, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 462 (describing the
need for a “certain causal nexus” between the wrongful act and resulting harm).
142 See, for example, the U.S. and British commissioners’ joint report submitted in 1904
regarding the Samoan dispute, cited in Tumonis, supra note 134, at 141 (“[A] wrongdoer is
liable [for] the damages which are both, in fact, caused by his action, and cannot be
attributed to any other cause, and which a reasonable man in a position of the wrongdoer
at the time would have foreseen as likely to ensue from his action.”).
143 Plakokefalos, supra note 134, at 483.
144 Id. at 472 (noting also that “[o]verdetermination, broadly defined, is the existence of
multiple causes . . . contributing towards a harmful outcome,” which becomes more likely
as the complexity of State relations and “potentially harmful outcomes” increase).
145 See Andrea Gattini, Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in
the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 695, 710–11 (2007) (“The commentary on
Article 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility reflects Crawford’s view, although
the ILC tried to compose both opinions . . . .”).
146 Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, [1989] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 1, 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.I (arguing that “to hold the author
State liable for full compensation would be neither equitable nor in conformity with a
proper application of the causal link criterion”); see also Plakokefalos, supra note 134, at
481 (discussing Arangio-Ruiz’s report); Gattini, supra note 145, at 710–11 (contrasting
Arangio-Ruiz’s and Crawford’s positions).
147 See James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, [2000] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.I (claiming that Arangio-Ruiz’s position
“is not consistent with international practice and the decisions of international tribunals”).
148 Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm 2001, supra note 136, at 98.
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The International Court of Justice has been somewhat ambivalent
about this matter as well.149 In the early Corfu Channel case, the
Court imputed to Albania “damage and loss of human life” resulting
from an explosion of mines in Albanian waters, even if it had been
Yugoslavia who had placed the mines in its territory in the first
place.150 In the 2007 Bosnian Genocide case, however, the Court
found that Serbia had breached its obligation to prevent the commis-
sion of a genocide, but it refused to grant compensation for lack of a
“sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act
. . . and the injury suffered . . . .”151 Commentators have noted that
“there is no compelling legal rationale whatsoever” to the causation
standard applied by the Court in this case,152 and that, “[c]ontrary to
what the ICJ claims, [this] test is not accepted, at least not unequivo-
cally, in international law.”153
Emerging from this discussion, there is yet another problem
relating to causation, this time not related to the determination of the
breach but to the determination of the kind and amount of reparation
owed. According to the ILC, “the subject matter of reparation is,
globally, the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act,
rather than any and all consequences flowing from an internationally
wrongful act.”154 This formulation is simple—but perhaps too simple.
What distinguishes in this context an “injury” deriving from a certain
act, from mere “consequences” flowing from it? Again, there is no
149 See, e.g., Plakokefalos, supra note 134, at 490 (“It is interesting to note at this point
the discrepancy between the approach of the Court in Corfu Channel and Bosnian
Genocide.”).
150 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 9); see also
Plakokefalos, supra note 134, at 484–85 (arguing that the ICJ “did not engage in any
meaningful causal analysis,” leaving open the question of if Albania must compensate for
the entire damages or if the damage “can be divisible”).
151 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 462 (Feb.
26).
152 See Tumonis, supra note 134, at 142–43 (arguing also that a proper explanation to
this decision “relates to the conciliatory justice and judicial politics: the Court’s desire to
satisfy both parties by splitting their differences”); see also Gattini, supra note 145, at 711
(arguing that, despite the court’s apparent motivation of encouraging reconciliation
between the parties, “on the whole the Court’s decision to dispose of the matter of
reparation by means of a simple declaration in the judgment as a form of satisfaction seems
to have been quite rushed, and unfortunately gives the whole judgment a flavour of half-
heartedness”).
153 Plakokefalos, supra note 134, at 490. Plakokefalos further notes that, as evidenced by
the Bosnian Genocide case, courts do not explain their causal analysis in detail even when
they do apply some test: “They do not explain why they use a particular test, they do not
apply a test consistently and, especially in cases of overdetermination, they simply apply
unhelpful tests, such as the but-for test.” Id.
154 Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm 2001, supra note 136, at 92 (emphasis added).
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simple answer to this question, and states have not specifically regu-
lated upon it.
2. Violation of the General Duty to Prevent Transboundary Harm
The second claim that proponents of the lawsuit approach have
advanced is that China—and other states—may have breached their
duty to prevent (or at least to minimize) the risk of emergence and
spread of the virus.155 Zoonotic diseases like the SARS-CoV-2 are
widely believed to be the result of “human alteration of the natural
world.”156 Scientists have pointed to “anthropogenic disturbance of
forest ecosystems and increasing demand for meat and medicine
derived from wildlife” as the likely causes for this kind of viral spill-
over.157 Inappropriate regulation of the production chain and of the
sale conditions of meat products have emerged as at least part of the
explanation of the development of the pandemic.158 Further, once the
155 See, e.g., Coco & de Souza Dias, supra note 127, at 222 (“The concept of ‘harm’ is
broad enough to include the consequences of a disease outbreak such as COVID-19.”);
Russell Miller & William Starshak, China’s Responsibility for the Global Pandemic, JUST
SEC. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69398/chinas-responsibility-for-the-
global-pandemic (comparing the case with the Trail Smelter arbitration and concluding
that “China should compensate the world for the personal and economic damage its
policies have caused”); Bagares, supra note 127 (“China is duty-bound to ensure that
individuals within its territory do not cause harm to the rights of other states. Moreover,
where the harmful acts were committed by persons exercising public authority, the acts are
attributable to the state.”). Former President Trump also seems to be thinking of
something along these lines: “This was sent to us by China, one way or the other, and we’re
never going to forget it. Believe me, we’re never going to forget it. . . . [I]t should have
been stopped by China, and it wasn’t.” Jonathan Swan, Donald Trump Interview Transcript
with Jonathan Swan of Axios on HBO, REV TRANSCRIPTS (Aug. 3, 2020) https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-interview-transcript-with-axios-on-hbo.
Senator Lindsey Graham, as Chair of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, seems to
entertain a similar view: “Whether it was a mistake in a lab or spread at a wet market I
don’t know, but we do know where it came from. We also know that China failed to inform
the world about the nature of the virus . . . .” The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
Coronavirus, and Addressing China’s Culpability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong., at 11:23 (2020) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Judiciary), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-foreign-sovereign-
immunities-act-coronavirus-and-addressing-chinas-culpability.
156 Farnese, supra note 111, at 287.
157 Gabriele Volpato, Michele F. Fontefrancesco, Paolo Gruppuso, Dauro M. Zocchi &
Andrea Pieroni, Baby Pangolins on My Plate: Possible Lessons to Learn from the COVID-
19 Pandemic, 16 J. ETHNOBIOLOGY & ETHNOMEDICINE, no. 19, 2020, at 2 (explaining that
“SARS-CoV-2 is the latest of several viruses that have emerged in wildlife, . . . mutated,
and then spread from human to human” and listing numerous factors that increase the
likelihood of such diseases emerging).
158 Some commentators have discussed the regulatory failures regarding wet markets,
the “likely zoonotic origin of the COVID-19.” Hussin A. Rothan & Siddappa N.
Byrareddy, The Epidemiology and Pathogenesis of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
Outbreak, J. AUTOIMMUNITY, May 2020, at 3. Some claim that the sale of exotic animals
should not be allowed in wet markets. See, e.g., A. Alonso Aguirre, Richard Catherina,
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outbreak was clear, negligent local decisions of various states to, for
example, allow “super-spreader” massive events, delay lock-downs, or
fail to implement test-and-trace policies, rapidly accelerated the dis-
semination of the disease, including beyond jurisdictional borders.159
As we saw in the previous section, the IHR do not provide spe-
cific guidance on the substantive duties of prevention that states have
in relation to infectious diseases.160 However, under general interna-
tional law, states have a broad obligation not to harm each other in
the exercise of their sovereignty161—sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, a “foundational principle of international law.”162 In the 1949
Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice explained that
it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”163 In the 2010
Pulp Mills case, the Court described this principle as a customary rule
and explained that “[a] State is thus obliged to use all the means at its
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or
in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage” to other
States.164
The evident problem with the application of this principle, absent
specific regulation of obligations to prevent pandemics, is that “this
right not to suffer transboundary harm is also limited by a duty to
tolerate certain interferences—a duty that is coextensive with the
Hailey Frye & Louise Shelley, Illicit Wildlife Trade, Wet Markets, and COVID-19:
Preventing Future Pandemics, 12 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y, Sept. 2020, at 8. Others,
however, are more cautious, advocating for decreased meat consumption globally and
moving such markets to local, more environmentally friendly markets. See Ivica Petrikova,
Jennifer Cole & Andrew Farlow, COVID-19, Wet Markets, and Planetary Health, 4
LANCET PLANETARY HEALTH e213, e214 (2020).
159 See, e.g., Lucas Bergkamp, State Liability for Failure to Control the COVID-19
Epidemic: International and Dutch Law, 11 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 343, 345 (2020) (“For
instance, it has been reported that Austrian ski resorts ignored COVID-19 outbreaks in
order to avoid harm to their economies. Such omissions by municipal or local governments
are likely attributable to the state of Austria, and thus will entail Austria’s state liability.”).
160 See supra Section II.B.1.
161 For a discussion of this principle and its legal validity, see supra Part I.
162 BRUNNÉE, supra note 51, ¶¶ 1, 17 (“[S]ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas . . . stands
for the proposition that one State’s sovereign right to use its territory is circumscribed by
an obligation not to cause injury to, or within, another State’s territory.”).
163 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 6, 22 (Apr. 9). The decision of
the Court built implicitly on the precedent established in the 1941 Trail Smelter arbitration,
in which the tribunal stated that a state’s use of its territory must not “cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”
Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 684, 684 (1941). For a commentary on
this caselaw and its current relevance, see TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 49.
164 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 101
(Apr. 20).
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neighbouring State’s right to use its territory.”165 Where to draw the
threshold between admissible and non-admissible externalities is a
question “as important as it is complex”166: Is the harm “subjective or
fault-based? Or is it objective, focusing on the severity of the harm
inflicted on the neighbouring State? Or a combination of the two?”167
The ILC attempted to take up these questions and expound the
meaning of the no-harm principle in the 2001 Draft Articles on the
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.168
There, the ILC explained that states have to “take all appropriate
measures to prevent significant transboundary harm.”169 This formula-
tion puts forward a more practical standard, but one that still hinges
crucially, on two vague terms: first, on the meaning of the term
“harm”; and second, on an explanation of which measures are consid-
ered “appropriate.”170 The Commission did make an effort to provide
definitions. The ILC defined “harm” as “harm caused to persons,
property or the environment.”171 Additionally, the ILC explained in
its commentary that “appropriate” refers to “the degree of care in
question is that expected of a good Government.”172
Neither of these definitions provides an operative solution to the
questions about the threshold between admissible and non-admissible
externalities presented earlier.173 What is significantly harmful to per-
sons, property, and the environment? What is the degree of care
expected from a good government? What indication does this give us
about the legal obligations of states to prevent the pandemic? The
165 BRUNNÉE, supra note 51, ¶ 4; see also XUE HANQUIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (2003) (“Prevention of harm need not be absolute and has to
be weighed against equitable and reasonable utilization.”).
166 BRUNNÉE, supra note 51, ¶ 7; see also XUE, supra note 165, at 7 (“Both in theory and
in practice, the need for a threshold criterion has never been doubted, but what that should
be has long been debated, along with the dilemma of how strict international liability rules
should be.”).
167 BRUNNÉE, supra note 51, ¶ 7.
168 See Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm 2001, supra note 136, at 31.
169 Id. at 146 (emphasis added); see also XUE, supra note 165, at 7 (“International law
only tackles those cases where transboundary damage has reached a certain degree of
severity.”).
170 This is not surprising. As explained by Rebecca Bratspies and Russell Miller,
“[d]efining ‘harm’ or ‘damage’ . . . may be the most confounding facet of forming a legal
response to transboundary harm . . . .” Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller,
Introduction, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE
TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 49, at 1, 7; see also infra Section III.A.
171 Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm 2001, supra note 136, at 146.
172 Id. at 160.
173 Handl, supra note 49, at 132 (explaining that “there is general agreement that the no-
significant-harm obligation is one of due diligence” and that the required restraints will
vary with the circumstances).
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existing rules of international law seem again unable to answer the
crucial questions posed by COVID-19.
3. Liability for Licit but Hazardous Activities
Finally, some have claimed that even if states were indeed dili-
gent in their conduct, they may still be liable for the licit but haz-
ardous activities occurring within their jurisdiction and thus bound to
compensate for the harm generated by their activities.174 This claim
has been put forward much less frequently than the previous two
claims. It similarly shows, however, the need for international lawyers
to rely on very general principles in order to pursue legal accounta-
bility from China.
As with the previous claims, there is no specific, consent-based
regulation of liability for transboundary harm caused by pandemics.
Thus, the whole claim needs to be built on the basis of the no-harm
principle, as discussed by the ILC in its 2006 Draft Principles on the
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm.175 These prin-
ciples explain that states may be liable for certain licit but hazardous
activities when they harm other states. The claim, in this case, is that
some states, such as China, enjoyed the benefits of a number of alleg-
edly hazardous activities (such as producing and consuming meat of
wild animals, or, in the case of other states, carrying on with massive
sporting events during an infectious outbreak) and should now be
liable for the damage created, irrespective of whether they were dili-
gent or not.
In the 2006 principles, the Commission acknowledged that the
question of causation, foreseeability, and remoteness of the damage is
difficult, stating that “[d]ifferent jurisdictions have applied these con-
cepts with different results,”176 making this “a highly discretionary and
unpredictable branch of law.”177 The ILC also clarified that only “sig-
nificant” damage generates liability—damage that is more than
“detectable” but less than “serious” or “substantial.”178 As the
Commission itself noted, the determination of what is “significant” is
very much contextual: It “is dependent on the circumstances of a par-
174 See Chiradeep Basak, Can China Be Sued at the ICJ for Causing Transboundary
Harm for Covid-19 Pandemic? , EURASIAN TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
eurasiantimes.com/can-china-be-sued-at-the-icj-for-causing-transboundary-harm-for-covid-
19-pandemic.
175 Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, [2006] 2(2) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 59–90, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1.
176 Id. at 79.
177 Id. at 65.
178 Id.
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ticular case and the period in which it is made.”179 The ILC was also
quite vague when it came to defining the meaning of “prompt and
adequate compensation”180 in the context of liability for hazardous
activities, only pointing to “cost internalization” and “equity and
mutual accommodation” as guiding principles.181
C. Systemic Challenges with Fragmented Solutions
Each of the three claims upon which the lawsuit approach may
rely hinges on questions that the existing international rules do not
fully resolve: the extent of the relevant causal links, the determination
of how much of an illicit act results in an injury, the definition of what
is harmful (and what is “significantly” harmful), and the determina-
tion of which measures are appropriate to prevent said harm.
These questions could have been solved by way of international
agreement if the IHR had adopted a preventive, anticipatory
approach to infectious diseases—which, as we saw, it did not. This is
what states actually did for some other specific regimes in which trans-
boundary damage is usual, such as those dealing with international
watercourses182 and with outer space activities.183 They negotiated
and agreed upon more precise obligations deriving from the broad
rules outlined above.
In yet other regimes of international law, such as investment arbi-
tration or human rights law, a prominent body of caselaw has devel-
oped specific answers to analogous sets of questions.184 But that is no
179 Id.
180 Id. at 72–83.
181 Id. at 74, 76.
182 See generally Stephen C. McCaffrey, International Watercourses, Environmental
Protection, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L. (Apr. 2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e954 (explaining what harm
means in the context of shared international watercourses).
183 See generally Christos Kypraios & Elena Carpanelli, Space Debris, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L. (Sept. 2018), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2202 (explaining what harm means in the context of
the interactions of states in outer space).
184 Both of these regimes have two features that reasonably narrow the breadth of the
question. First, they both have an authoritative adjudicator who interprets and applies
reasonably self-contained bodies of law that were progressively developed through
abundant caselaw. Second, and more importantly, both regimes primarily address the
relationship between a state and an individual under its jurisdiction. This feature allows
filling in the voids by appeal to internal features of the state’s legal system through legal
devices such as the “margin of appreciation” in human rights law or the “fair and equitable
treatment” standard in investment law. Also, in international investment law, there is an
explicit recourse to the transnational market of the goods affected. This is impossible when
we talk about non-fully-commodified goods such as human health, psychological damage,
or life itself. For a systematic review of the issues arising from compensation in
international investment and human rights law respectively, see IRMGARD MARBOE,
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solution here: There is no specific tribunal with jurisdiction over
health issues and, in other courts, “few cases can be found tackling the
international governance of infectious diseases, i.e. there is no devel-
oped judicial discourse [on these issues].”185 The broader, state-to-
state litigation context of general international law is not very helpful
either. There, again, the “paucity of useful international prece-
dents”186—which is itself the result of the same jurisdictional obstacles
that apply to the COVID-19 scenario—has also deprived us of guid-
ance on how to distribute the burdens caused by the pandemic. The
few existing cases (for example, the Trail Smelter case in relation to
transboundary harm187 and the Chórzow Factory188 or Corfu
Channel189 cases in relation to compensation) are merely sources of
the broad principles outlined above.
These differences in the application of the broader principles
among different regimes are, no doubt, the result of the uneven
judicialization and, more broadly, of the uneven institutionalization of
international law. Since “international courts and tribunals are signifi-
cant on some issues but not others, [and] in some parts of the world
much more than others,”190 it is only reasonable that dense rules will
only appear for certain issues and in certain places. In other words,
states have decided to create tribunals to deal with investment and
trade, but not to deal with the prevention of pandemics. These differ-
ences in the density of both regulation and precedent are the result
not only of political decisions, but also of practical necessities. While,
for example, international investment has been going on for centuries,
the velocity and reach of COVID-19 took international law for sur-
prise.191 Recall once again Benvenisti’s apartment-building meta-
CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
(2d ed. 2017) and DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
315–76 (3d ed. 2015).
185 Leonie Vierck, The Case Law of International Public Health and Why Its Scarcity Is a
Problem, in THE GOVERNANCE OF DISEASE OUTBREAKS: INTERNATIONAL HEALTH LAW:
LESSONS FROM THE EBOLA CRISIS AND BEYOND 113, 116 (Leonie Vierck, Pedro A.
Villarreal & A. Katrina Weilert, eds., 2017).
186 Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 853 (2002).
187 Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, supra note 163, at 684.
188 Ger. v. Pol., 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
189 U.K. v. Alb., Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. (Apr. 9).
190 Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: Uneven Judicialisation in Global Order, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, 211 (James Crawford &
Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
191 Of course, velocity, reach, and other practical concerns are not the only explanations
for the development of institutions. The fact that some institutions do emerge, and some
others do not, also has prominently ideological explanations. See id. at 211–12 (explaining
how the judicialization of certain areas of international law is the result of the expansion of
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phor192: We have been sharing roads for years and have clear rules to
govern them, but we only develop protocols to deal with broken ele-
vators (or to prevent them from breaking) once they fail for the first
time. New problems create incentives for new rules, and COVID-19 is,
in many ways, new. Thus, states have not reached an agreement in
relation to their obligations for the prevention of pandemics.193 The
question of who should pay for the pandemic is more difficult than it
seems at first sight.
III
THE NORMATIVE BACKGROUND TO THE LAWSUIT
APPROACH
The fact that the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm define “harm” as “harm”194 should not be quickly mistaken for
poor craft, but rather as reflecting a fundamental condition of law
more generally. It is not by chance that the lawsuit approach keeps
running into a void when it tries to work out fundamental issues of
harm and causation. The sweeping indeterminacy of these concepts
pervades many areas of law.195
A general norm that prevents people, or countries, from causing
harm to each other cannot be more than a formal rule, impracticable
without a substantive account of what counts as a harm and what
counts as causing it. Developing such an account requires more than
conceptual or doctrinal analysis. Establishing what is harm (or, in
other words, what constitutes an externality) depends on “an analyti-
the international liberal order). We thank Francisco-José Quintana for pointing this out to
us.
192 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
193 This does not mean that international lawyers are unable to answer the question of
who should pay for the pandemic. What it does mean, however, is that whoever attempts
to give such an answer will need to articulate a normative argument that fills these voids, as
we argue in the following sections. This is uncontroversial for nonpositivist approaches to
legal interpretation, which consider normative evaluations to be part and parcel of legal
reasoning. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); Anne Peters, Realizing Utopia
as a Scholarly Endeavour, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 533 (2013) (addressing the issue as it relates
to international law). But it is also true for positivist approaches, which acknowledge that
there may be lacunae in the law and that such voids are to be filled with bounded
discretion by the officer in charge of the interpretation. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 272–73 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the unavoidable nature of judicial discretion);
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 349 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1970) (arguing that
“determination can never be complete” and that, therefore, “[t]here must always be more
or less room for discretion”). We thank Martins Paparinskis for pressing us on this point.
194 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
195 For examples of how the concept of “harm” is undetermined in other branches of
law other than international law, see infra Section III.A.
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cally prior account of what each of us owes one another.”196 There is
no raw concept of harm upon which the law later builds. The grief of a
parent who is estranged from her child is legally cognizable “harm” if
the child was criminally abducted but becomes irrelevant if she is
legally imprisoned. Even in its crudest forms, “suffering in law is nor-
mative all the way down.”197
Needless to say, this problem haunts international law as well.
Let us come back to Mattias Kumm’s account of “externalities” as the
framework structuring the lawsuit approach. Kumm carefully distin-
guishes externalities that raise “justice concerns”198 from those that do
not.199 At the same time, he does not consider the failure to provide
for the creation of a common good as an externality per se200—unless
there is an obligation to do so.201 Kumm sets out to provide a justifica-
tion for existing international law but is instead forced to rely on
existing legal understandings to distinguish externalities that are per-
missible from those that are not.202 Without incorporating an indepen-
dent substantive judgment, even a sophisticated reconstruction of the
lawsuit approach will fail in providing a ready-made distinction of
what should count as harm to be repaired and what belongs to chaos
or fate. In what follows, we analyze the normative complexities that
will pervade any legal analysis of (1) “harm” and (2) “causation.”
A. Harm is Normative
The lawsuit approach relies on the no-harm principle in interna-
tional law: States are sovereign and have a “right to be left alone”203
insofar as they do not impose externalities on other states—that is,
196 Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 96
(1995).
197 Linda Ross Meyer, Suffering the Loss of Suffering: How Law Shapes and Occludes
Pain, in KNOWING THE SUFFERING OF OTHERS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON PAIN AND ITS
MEANINGS 16 (Austin Sarat ed., 2014).
198 Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 251 (listing “states implementing
national policies, burdening outsiders with harms, and threatening harm or risks,” such as
imperialist foreign policy or downstream pollution).
199 Id. at 253 (“A wide range of externalities, however, do not [raise justice concerns].
Outsiders have no claim of justice against a state’s political community that fails to take
into account their well-being when making a decision that has external effects.”).
200 Id. at 254 (“There is no legitimate justice claim against one political community for
failing to realize economic benefits for another political community.”).
201 Id. at 251 (“Justice concerns are not merely raised by negative externalities of state
action, but also by omissions that result in the failure to realize positive externalities when
the state has a responsibility to act.”).
202 This critique is advanced by Neil Walker, The Return of Constituent Power: A Reply
to Mattias Kumm, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 906, 910–12 (2016).
203 Kumm, The Right to Be Left Alone, supra note 6, at 239.
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unless they harm those other states.204 The idea of “harm” is primor-
dial in these accounts.205 However, identifying harm is not as simple as
it might look at first sight. Any theory that pertains to limiting the
action of an agent based on the prohibition of inflicting “harm” on
another must rely on a substantive notion of harm that it cannot itself
provide.
We can find the most stylized version of this discussion in the
attempt by some liberal philosophers, following John Stuart Mill, to
use the harm principle to define the limits of criminal law—that is, to
limit state power by preventing the state from forbidding conduct that
does not harm anyone else. Most famously, for Joel Feinberg, harm
and offense to others “exhaust the class of good reasons for criminal
prohibitions.”206 Feinberg readily acknowledges that the concept of
harm “must be made sufficiently precise” or it “may be taken to invite
state interference without limit, for virtually every kind of human con-
duct can affect the interests of others for better and worse to some
degree.”207
It is not only, however, a matter of degree.208 Feinberg himself
incorporates normative elements into his concept of harm when he
ends up defining it as “a wrongfully set-back interest.”209 Commenting
on this definition, Judith Jarvis Thomson observes that, therefore, a
setback of interests constitutes harm only after “incorporat[ing] moral
considerations”: whether the act causing the setback is “indefensible
(that is, neither justified nor excused) and a violation of a right” of
someone else.210 The moral theory required for knowing what is
204 In his externality-based framework, Kumm conceptualizes “externalities” as a
function of “harm” or “risks.” Id. at 251. In economic analysis of law, externalities are also
defined similarly to “harm” and are prey to the same conceptual problems. See MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 59 (1997) (“[T]he concept of
externalities is one of the least satisfactory concepts in welfare economics, and the concept
of harm to others is one of the least satisfactory and most indeterminate concepts in liberal
political theory.”).
205 See supra Part I.
206 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 15,
26 (1984).
207 Id. at 12.
208 International law has focused on this aspect of harm, seemingly assuming universal
agreement on what constitutes harm and allowing for marginal disputes as to the threshold
above which harm is to be attended by the international legal system. See, e.g., JULIO
BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–11
(2011) (acknowledging the difficulties in setting a threshold for harm that is legally
cognizable); see also supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text (surveying the discussion
on what “significant” harm means in international law).
209 FEINBERG, supra note 206, at 105 (emphasis omitted).
210 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Feinberg on Harm, Offense, and the Criminal Law: A Review
Essay, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 381, 383 (reviewing FEINBERG, supra note 206).
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indefensible, excusable, or justified, or to know what a person’s rights
are, is not provided by the harm principle itself.211 In a similar way,
most of the authors dealing with the problem of harm agree that some
sort of moralization of the conception of harm is necessary if it is to be
fruitful.212 More straightforwardly, legal philosophers from conti-
nental European traditions are less troubled in recognizing that
without a substantive account of value, the harm principle is
circular.213
Saying that we should not “harm” others, therefore, does not tell
us which actions are to be counted as “harming” unless we have a
prior normative scheme telling us which goods we deem valuable for
protection. This conceptual problem permeates many branches of law
that work with one or another version of harm. Alterum non laedere,
Latin for “do not harm others,” is a principle of private law every-
where.214 Economic-oriented analyses of law similarly propose that
the state primarily regulates “externalities” that agents impose on
each other as they conduct their private activities.215 More generally,
211 See id. at 384 (“Which of the acts that set another person’s interests back are
indefensible? Which are violations of his rights? . . . Feinberg does not provide us with a
moral theory which would answer these questions, nor does he think he needs to.”).
212 Similarly, Joseph Raz argues that “[s]ince ‘causing harm’ entails by its very meaning
that the action is prima facie wrong, it is a normative concept acquiring its specific meaning
from the moral theory within which it is embedded,” without which it would “lack[]
specific concrete content and lead[] to no policy conclusions.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 414 (1986). It is fairly discussed whether Mill’s own conception of
harm was a moralized one. John Gray, for example, asserts that “[n]owhere in Mill’s
writings do we detect any awareness that, as it is employed in ordinary thought and
practice, the concept of harm embodies substantive moral judgements . . . .” JOHN GRAY,
LIBERALISM 53 (1986); see also TREBILCOCK, supra note 204, at 61 (“Mill seems to have
been largely oblivious to the unavoidably moralized nature of the harm principle . . . .”).
But see Nils Holtug, The Harm Principle, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 357, 377
n.37 (2002) (stating that “[i]t is (now) common to interpret Mill as introducing a moral
component in his concept of harm” and citing philosophers who have made that assertion).
For a review of the strategies that have been deployed by liberal philosophers to
“moralize” the harm principle, see DAVID O. BRINK, MILL’S PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES
187–89 (2013).
213 See, e.g., ALF ROSS, ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 53 (1975) (“[The
harm principle] was just another of those familiar idle formulae which implicitly
presuppose what they set out to justify.”).
214 For a history of this principle, see Francesco Parisi, Alterum Non Laedere: An
Intellectual History of Civil Liability, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 317 (1994). For an analysis of the
context-dependent nature of torts, see Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts,
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1348–49 (2008) (“[T]he typical definition [of tort] can be
characterized as content-free tautology. . . . In short, a tort is what a court says it is.”).
215 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 254 (1992) (“[T]he most
dramatic economic function of the common law is to correct externalities . . . .”); see also
GORDON TULLOCK, PUBLIC GOODS, REDISTRIBUTION AND RENT SEEKING 8 (2005)
(“There is no way of deciding whether [throwing a party late at night in an apartment
building] is an externality except [for] the prevailing customs or the legal situation.”).
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domestic legal systems usually limit access to courts to those claiming
an injury.216
International law, as we saw, possesses its own “no harm prin-
ciple.” However, even though the principle can be dated back to a
venerable lineage, the doctrinal need for harm as an autonomous
source of legal obligation is relatively recent. Although harm was
always there in the theoretical background, the development of a gen-
eral theory of harm was constantly superseded by particularistic anal-
yses of the different areas of law. To take the most obvious example,
think of armed conflict: It goes unstated that the reason why we gen-
erally prohibit direct military action against a non-belligerent state is
that military hostility is harmful to the country victim to it. We do not
need, however, to rely on a general concept of harm to deal with mili-
tary action. Because the damages caused by armed hostilities are as
old as interaction between states, a body of law pertaining to regu-
lating them developed together with history.217 The same can be said
of other areas of international law, such as law of the sea,218 or con-
crete issues like downstream pollution.219
It is not by chance, then, that the theoretical elaboration of harm
in international law as a general concept gained traction in recent
decades. As the transboundary effect of domestic policies in a global-
ized world became harder to discipline in pre-established and discrete
legal categories, the need became evident for a general notion of harm
that could govern unforeseen cases of state responsibility—such as a
pandemic.220
216 Cass Sunstein has shown how the attempt by the Supreme Court to establish a
standard of injury-in-fact for the purposes of standing to sue independent of normative
judgments is doomed to fail. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188–89 (1992) (“In classifying some
harms as injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological, courts must inevitably rely
on some standard that is normatively laden . . . .”).
217 For a comprehensive review of the evolution of the laws of war, see STEPHEN C.
NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY (2005).
218 Take, for instance, the right of innocent passage. After centuries of practice, states
acknowledged that there was no harm in allowing ships to pass through a coastal state’s
territorial sea provided the passage complied with a number of conditions. For a review of
these norms, see Kari Hakapää, Innocent Passage, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L.
(May 2013), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1178?prd=MPIL.
219 See generally Volker Röben, Air Pollution, Transboundary Aspects, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIAS INT’L L. (July 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1560?prd=EPIL (explaining the content of harm in
the context of the law of transboundary air pollution).
220 For a discussion of the importance of the no-harm principle for international law to
be able to deal with novel transboundary problems such as terrorism, corporate social
responsibility, refugees, internet torts, and drug trafficking, see TRANSBOUNDARY HARM
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The relative novelty of the notion of “harm” in international law
exposes its need for a normative ground on which to rely in unprece-
dented cases. The environment is perhaps an example in point—in
fact, the generic notion of transboundary harm was modeled after the
specific concept of transboundary environmental harm, rather than
the other way around.221 Decades ago, Martti Koskenniemi noted that
“what the law protects is not the nature but what is refected [sic] of
nature in the eye of the sovereign beholder.”222 This “reflection” is no
more than the normative judgments that make nature valuable at all.
Nature, after all, is a social creation,223 and what counts as harming it
depends on normative judgments of what we deem an “unharmed”
nature to be.224 Pollution, notably, is such a flexible concept that it
could be as narrow as to exclude carbon dioxide225 or as broad as to
encompass pornography.226
Someone may object that COVID-19 is quite literally a matter of
life or death, not a gray case subject to these scholarly elucubrations.
Until very recently, however, it was denied that the generation of a
pandemic could constitute harm for international law purposes at all.
For decades, David Fidler, a leading scholar in international health
law, could write that the effects of pandemics were not encompassed
by the legal regime of transboundary harm, since he deemed this
notion confined to international environmental law.227 By 2020, how-
ever, most international lawyers agree that a pandemic can be encom-
passed by the general regime of transboundary harm.228 Yet we might
still disagree about which of the consequences of COVID-19 are to be
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note
49, at 225–95.
221 See generally id. (discussing the reconstruction of the notion of transboundary harm
and its application in different fields on the basis of the seminal Trail Smelter arbitration).
222 Koskenniemi, supra note 118, at 75.
223 See generally NEIL EVERNDEN, THE SOCIAL CREATION OF NATURE (1992)
(discussing the dynamic and society-dependent conceptions of nature over time).
224 See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in
Environmental Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505, 1507 (2011) (“Descriptions of environmental
harm thereby incorporate implicit normative judgments in the form of unspecified and
undefended baselines.”).
225 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (showing a 5-3 split over whether
carbon dioxide qualifies as an “air pollutant” under federal law for regulatory purposes).
226 See John Copeland Nagle, Pornography as Pollution, 70 MD. L. REV. 939, 940–41
(2011) (arguing that pornography can be understood and regulated “as a problem of
pollution”).
227 See, e.g., FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE,
supra note 16, at 110–12.
228 Most of the international lawyers that came forward analyzing China’s responsibility
for the COVID-19 pandemic did not dispute the applicability of the no-harm principle.
Rather, objections were directed at issues related to evidence, jurisdiction, or causation.
See supra Section II.B.
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taken into account, how deaths and health complications should be
accounted for, or whether the prejudicial economic effects of
lockdowns are to be counted as a direct effect of the pandemic. All
these questions and many more depend on non-trivial normative
assessments. They reveal, incidentally, that the question of what
counts as harm is inextricably intertwined with the question of what
counts as causing it.
B. Causation is Normative
We need not delve into the philosophical details of causation to
grasp that selecting an actual “cause” from a “mere condition” of an
event entails non-trivial normative judgments.229 We tend to treat
those actions that interfere with the normal course of events as
“causes.”230 When asked for the “cause” of a fire in a house, one is
expected to say something like, “The kids forgot to turn the stove off”;
it would be very unusual to say that the “cause” of the fire was the
presence of oxygen in the air. What constitutes a “cause,” therefore,
depends to a large extent on what we consider to be normal affairs.
Activists for political and social change usually challenge these under-
standings of normalcy, and their claims can be translated to the lan-
guage of causation. Feminism231 and socialism,232 very clearly,
encourage us to see traceable causal links waiting to be interrupted
and reversed, rather than the raw, inevitable coexistence of events.
This normativity of causation becomes explicit, almost manufac-
tured, when we turn to law. It is widely argued that causation in law
229 Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and
Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1014
(1988) (offering an aged but relevant discussion of the main concepts in causation in the
law of torts).
230 See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 29 (2d ed. 1985) (“The
notion, that a cause is essentially something which interferes with or intervenes in the
course of events which would normally take place, is central to the common-sense concept
of cause . . . .”).
231 Perhaps the most classical example of the role of causation in understanding gender
relations is the debate about the role of pornography in fostering violence against women.
Catharine MacKinnon explicitly addresses the matter: “Harm is caused to one individual
woman rather than another essentially the way one number rather than another is caused
in roulette. . . . Its causality is essentially collective and totalistic and contextual. To reassert
atomistic linear causality as a sine qua non of injury . . . [ignores the] nature of this . . .
harm.” CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 156–57 (1987).
232 In a well-known passage, Friedrich Engels denounces the narrowness of the liberal
notion of causation: “Murder has also been committed if society places hundreds of
workers in such a position that they inevitably come to premature and unnatural ends.
Their death is as violent as if they had been stabbed or shot.” FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE
CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND 108 (W.O. Henderson & W.H.
Chaloner eds. and trans., 1958).
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“is not logic. It is practical politics.”233 What events are deemed to be
the cause of others can be thought of as a policy choice driven by
political decisions, cultural dispositions, and ideological motiva-
tions.234 The law of torts provides abundant examples of how, in dif-
ferent systems, the rearrangement of relevant causality ascribes
liability to different events. Morton Horwitz, for example, notes that
at the end of the nineteenth century, different views on causation in
American law stemmed from different ideological standpoints. In
1874, commenting on John Stuart Mill’s account of causation, legal
scholar Francis Wharton noted that a notion of causation according to
which “the cause of an event is the sum of all its antecedents” inevi-
tably leads to communism.235 If everything could be deemed the cause
of everything, Wharton noted, anyone, and particularly those with
deep pockets, could be made to pay for any bad thing that
happened.236
As Ripstein and Coleman remind us, “causation is every-
where,”237 and therefore the selection of relevant causes is neither
natural nor innocent. Some activities that are indisputably the cause of
other events are not seen as such for legal purposes. To cite a usual
example, whether “the loss you suffer when my business succeeds in
taking clients away from you is yours or mine does not depend on
whether my business activity is the cause of your loss; instead, it
depends on whether I owe you a duty not to interfere with your busi-
ness interests . . . .”238 The rise of a successful competitor in the mar-
ketplace might very well be the “cause” of my bankruptcy, but
ordinarily she will not be charged with repairing the loss she caused,
unless, perhaps, she did so in violation of the applicable legal
framework.
233 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
234 See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 106 (1975) (“[I]n law the term ‘cause’ is used in
different guises but always to identify those pressure points that are most amenable to the
social goals we wish to accomplish . . . .”).
235 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 54 (1992) (quoting FRANCIS WHARTON, A SUGGESTION AS
TO CAUSATION 5, 10 (1874)).
236 See id. at 55 (“‘Here is a capitalist among these antecedents; he shall be forced to
pay.’ The capitalist, therefore, becomes liable for all disasters of which he is in any sense
the condition . . . .”) (quoting WHARTON, supra note 235, at 10–11).
237 Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 196, at 103.
238 Id. at 96.
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International law is not exempt from this problem, although the
role of causation remains relatively underexplored in the discipline.239
A general theory of causation in international law can only go as far as
a general theory of substantive obligation. Assessments of the
“causes” of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, have dwelled on a
possibly problematic relationship with nature or the failure to take
sufficient containment measures.240 In legal terms, however, these
could be said to be the “cause” of the pandemic only against the back-
ground of a specific obligation to act in a certain manner. Moreover,
the conditions that allowed the pandemic to spread globally so quickly
are innumerable. They include, notably, the proliferation of interna-
tional trade and travel: The virus spread thanks to people travelling
from one place to another in planes, ships, and trucks. Yet the interna-
tional community seems to consider these activities valuable enough
to obviate their role as “causes” of the pandemic. No one blames air-
lines for COVID-19, just like no one blames oxygen for house fires.
Quite on the contrary, international health law has, consistently
throughout its history, sought to minimize the risk of infectious dis-
eases while making sure that the affectation of trade and travel was as
minimal as possible.241 Causation, also in the case of pandemics,
involves a great deal of normative judgment.
IV
FILLING THE NORMATIVE VOIDS
The essential problem here is irreducible. To be taken seriously, a
lawsuit must provide a reasonable assessment of whether, for
example, China caused harm (and how much of it) to, for example,
the United States. This is not a merely factual question, nor a strictly
doctrinal one, but one that relies on previous, deep, normative assess-
ments that putatively have to be shared by both countries. This would
be easy if the IHR had included a clear statement of the preventive
obligations of each state. Yet as we saw, they did not. Thus, absent
specific agreement, in order to bring about compensation claims, even
the most neutral adjudicator cannot avoid taking substantive stands
239 See supra Section II.B.1. There are, however, certain regimes within the discipline
that have explored the matter further, such as, for instance, international investment law.
See, e.g., Patrick W. Pearsall & J. Benton Heath, Causation and Injury in Investor-State
Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY AND EMERGING ISSUES ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES AND
VALUATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 83, 85 (Christina L. Beharry
ed., 2018) (reviewing analyses of causation by investment arbitrators and suggesting,
nevertheless, that there is still significant confusion on the question of causation in the
field).
240 See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
241 See supra Part I.
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about what is internationally valuable in order to merit reparation—
and how much of it.242 This seems like a Herculean task, but it is actu-
ally part and parcel of an adjudicator’s job. There is a significant dif-
ference, however, between how domestic and international judges
approach this job. We begin (1) by considering the more familiar per-
spective of a domestic legal system, and then (2) by moving on to the
challenges faced by international adjudicators who have to fill these
normative voids.
A. Finding Value in a Domestic Legal System
In domestic settings, the complex normative decisions that
underlie compensation claims are likely to go unnoticed—like the
water in which we swim.243 The normative assumptions that underlie
legal determination of harm, causation, and reparation are in a way
settled by communitarian norms in a dialectic relationship with legal
authorities.244 When adjudicating a case, judges both inform and draw
upon social norms and expectations.245 People, at the same time,
adjust their behavior to official utterings, or react to them and attempt
to modify them.246
An invasion of privacy, for instance, is tortious insofar as it is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”247 When deciding whether
this is the case, a judge is doing no less than enforcing “rules of
civility” in her community.248 Whether someone has been “harmed,”
242 The lawsuit approach, therefore, necessitates something like a “public index of
goods,” which is impossible to obtain without “engaging in normative argument about the
values of various activities to us and the ways in which they matter in people’s lives.”
Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 196, at 128.
243 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729 (1973) (“Evaluative terms like . . .
harmful are easily used because people have remarkably consistent perceptions of normal
conditions and thus can agree in characterizing deviations from normalcy.”).
244 This of course does not mean that communitarian norms fully and peacefully resolve
all indeterminations in the law. Our claim is only that cultural norms are frequently used
for this purpose—and that this option is not available internationally.
245 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 349 (1996) (“[T]he law’s responsiveness to shifting
social norms has been mediated by the discretionary judgements of courts and juries
. . . .”).
246 For the concept of “responsive law,” see generally PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP
SELZNICK, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 73–113 (2d ed.
2001). See also id. at 77 (“A responsive institution retains a grasp on what is essential to its
integrity while taking account of new forces in its environment. . . . It perceives social
pressures as sources of knowledge and opportunities for self-correction.” (italicization
omitted)).
247 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. L. Inst. 1977).
248 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 966
(1989).
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in privacy law, depends on not only our self-conscious collective nor-
mative appraisals but also deep-seated cultural understandings of the
community.
If the case of privacy is particularly salient, it is not because it is
analytically distinct: In general, “what qualifies as harm rests largely
on societal norms about acceptable behavior.”249 Comparative studies
show how vicissitudes that are taken as wrongful harm in some com-
munities are lamented as karma in others.250 Even within the West,
for instance, the birth of a healthy child after a sterilization procedure
provides a cause of action in some places but is unthinkable in
others.251 Within the same community, social valuations shift across
time. As a classic sociological study on life insurance policies at the
turn of the 20th century shows, children’s lives in America went from
being economically worthless to being priceless in a few decades’
time.252 The transformation of gender and family relations in the last
decades turned forms of suffering previously disattended into legally
actionable harms, such as sexual harassment or corporal punish-
ment.253 Psychologists have reported the expansion of the realm of
aspects of the human experience that are considered to be harmful,254
which has consequences in legal assessments as well.255
249 Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
897, 932.
250 See Mauro Bussani & Marta Infantino, Tort Law and Legal Cultures, 63 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 77, 92 (2015) (“[E]mpirical studies have shown that, in rural zones of northern
Thailand, innocent victims of car accidents generally believe that, if they get injured (even
seriously), it was just their time to be injured, and therefore tend to blame their own karma
rather than the other driver’s negligent behavior.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
251 See id. at 93 (“Giving birth to a healthy child because of a doctor’s negligence in
performing a sterilization procedure . . . may be seen as no injury at all in largely Catholic
countries . . . . The same event, however, would be considered to be a harm . . . in non
(majoritarian)-Catholic countries . . . .”).
252 See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN 113 (1985) (“The sacralization of children in twentieth-century
America introduced fundamental changes in existing standards concerning the value of
child life.”).
253 See Joanne Conaghan, Law, Harm and Redress: A Feminist Perspective, 22 LEGAL
STUD. 319, 322 (2002) (exploring the idea of harm as a social construct).
254 Nick Haslam, Brodie C. Dakin, Fabian Fabiano, Melanie J. McGrath, Joshua Rhee,
Ekaterina Vylomova, Morgan Weaving & Melissa A. Wheeler, Harm Inflation: Making
Sense of Concept Creep, 31 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 254, 255–56 (2020) (reviewing the
authors’ previous work in which they found a “rising sensitivity to harm within at least
some Western cultures, such that previously innocuous or unremarked phenomena were
increasingly identified as harmful”).
255 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Power of the Normal 14 (Nov. 26, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3239204 (“The idea of concept creep has obvious relevance to
law. Constitutional terms, such as ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘equal protection of the law,’
can undergo both vertical and horizontal expansion.”); see also Avani Mehta Sood & John
M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization Goals, 100 CALIF. L.
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A similar phenomenon can be described for causation. What is
considered to be the “cause” of an event depends not only on the
rules of the physical world, but also on cultural assessments. Often, we
assess causation following moral judgments: There are motivations
that we consider wicked enough as to be charged with loosely related
bad consequences.256
Similarly, legal systems tend to deem the causal chain broken
when a force majeure—an unforeseeable and unavoidable event—
intervenes. Needless to say, what is expected from people to foresee
or avoid depends on culturally informed standards about a diligent
person.257 Courts draw on these understandings to sanction legally
imputable causes of events.
The infusion of culture into the legal system is inescapable. One
can only imagine a legal system in which damages and causes are
tabulated with a precision that prescinds of any subjective assessment:
Legal systems in the real world rely on abstract standards such as that
of the “reasonable person,” which encompasses a hybrid judgment
between statistically common behaviors and ideal communal
values.258 Moreover, despite its apparent homogeneity, the standard is
itself the locus for a contest over multiple meanings within the com-
munity.259 In the end, the “reasonable person” standard is given con-
tent only through the conscious and unconscious social deliberation
REV. 1313, 1346 (2012) (“[W]hile supposedly objective standards like the harm principle
appear to provide a way to overcome sectarian biases in legal decision making, the rhetoric
of harm can covertly become a conduit for morally or ideologically motivated agendas.”).
256 See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 368, 372
(1992) (empirically showing that when an event is the product of multiple forces, “the most
blameworthy of a set of causal candidates will be cited as the prepotent cause of an
event”). For an experimental application of this concept to legal judgments, see Janice
Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of
Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 292–300 (2012) (conducting “blame attribution[]”
experiments and exploring their implications for “legal situations when character or motive
information is most likely to enter the process,” such as criminal or antidiscrimination law).
257 See Bussani & Infantino, supra note 250, at 94 (“Like the perception of injuries,
understandings of causation and force majeure depend upon people’s considerations for
their and others’ behavior, upon their apprehension of the dividing line between natural
and social phenomena, and upon their visions of justice and of the society they live in.”).
258 For a review of such systems, see Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What Is
Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293 (2018).
259 An illustrative example is provided by the advocacy by feminist lawyers in the 1970s
of the “reasonable woman” standard to replace the “reasonable man” standard in
workplace harassment suits. See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men:
The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1215–20
(1990) (discussing Judge Keith’s dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th
Cir. 1986)).
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that leads up to “the social norms of the particular community.”260 In
this way, “cultural norms truly become the law.”261 Or, as one scholar
further generalizes, “[t]ort law is one mechanism by which communi-
ties survey their membership for consensus on emerging issues and
crystallize those views by announcing a verdict.”262
B. The Building of International Social Value
Returning to the pandemic, it should be apparent by now that a
compensation claim against China, or other states, for their role in the
pandemic would entail a series of non-trivial normative judgments.
For instance, was China’s regulation of wildlife strict enough as to
avoid unnecessary risks of generating zoonotic diseases? Did China
take enough measures to prevent the epidemic from spreading outside
its territory? Had China notified the WHO earlier about the sanitary
situation, would it be reasonable to expect countries to have taken
measures different than those they actually took? Assuming that
human loss can be repaired, how much is a human life worth for the
purposes of international reparation? Assuming economic loss is to be
compensated, what degree of economic sacrifice was reasonable to
incur in order to save lives, and what degree of it was unwarranted by
the circumstances? In the face of uncertainty, what costly precautions
were and were not reasonable for states to take?263
All these questions are paralyzingly complex, not only for the dia-
bolic evidentiary hurdles they entail, but also because of the seemingly
intractable normative questions they ask. Yet if a compensation law-
suit is going to be considered they have to be addressed as best as
possible. Any answer will ultimately rely on the normative operators
that were italicized in the previous paragraph. As one delves into
them, however, the need to fill them runs into a void. In a domestic
setting we would have asked how a reasonable member of the com-
munity would have acted, what she would have expected, or how
much she would have valued the social goods that were lost. Social
260 Paul T. Hayden, Cultural Norms as Law: Tort Law’s “Reasonable Person” Standard
of Care, 15 J. AM. CULTURE 45, 53 (1992).
261 Id. at 45.
262 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1364 (2017).
263 These questions track the actual claims made by lawyers and politicians discussing
China’s international responsibility. See supra Parts I, II. Similar questions were posed
during the SARS pandemic to show the complexity of state responsibility in such context.
See FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 16,
at 111–12 (“Even if a principle of international law existed requiring all states to address
sources of global or transboundary infectious disease harm within their territories, what
would constitute a breach of this obligation? Would China’s efforts . . . represent a breach,
even though it did take some steps (albeit in secret) . . . ?”).
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norms would have provided us with the interpersonal measure of
value that we needed to settle the case, and legal institutions would
have tested and challenged those norms.
In a transnational claim, by contrast, there is no sufficient global
community that can sustain the kind of global social norms needed to
fill these voids. One will search in vain for a “reasonable person”;
there is no way to know whose reasonableness should count. We, as a
global community, simply have not had that conversation yet.
Drawing on the reasonableness peculiar to any particular culture
would be an act of domination from one onto the other. But even if
we were willing to pay that price, arguably, no culture has well-
developed social norms on how much effort to put into not harming
outsiders (or what precautions to take to avoid being harmed by
them).
Lacking the thick societal understandings that underlie domestic
legal systems, international law does not seem to offer a complete
guide. Take the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm: States should “achieve an equitable balance of interests”
between the state host of the hazardous activity and those potentially
affected.264 Those interests include the “degree of risk of significant
transboundary harm” and the “importance of the activity, taking into
account its overall advantages . . . for the State of origin in relation to
the potential harm for the State likely to be affected.”265 This “bal-
ance” cannot be performed through abstract universalization or
mental experiments of putting ourselves in the shoes of others.266 The
relative importance of, say, water pollution and job creation are
bound to be very different in countries at different stages of develop-
ment or with different conceptions of nature.267 Whose balance should
count in order to establish an “acceptable” degree of risk? There is no
Archimedean fulcrum from which to make these calculations. Any
answer we provide will be inevitably infused with our own idiosyn-
cratic understandings on what is worth protecting.
264 Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm 2001, supra note 136.
265 Id. at 161.
266 Alexander Somek, The Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing
Transnational Democracy, 16 EUR. L.J. 375, 379 (2010) (“Universalisation can only tell us
what a country ought not do when we already know what . . . is objectively good regardless
of what countries may in fact prefer.”).
267 To some extent, attempts to enshrine “differential treatment” in climate change law
were an example of institutional acknowledgement of this kind of imbalance. See Lavanya
Rajamani, The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of
International Environmental Law, 88 INT’L AFFS. 605, 605 (2012) (describing some
consequences of a “world of unequal states . . . [that] differ widely both in their
contributions to global environmental degradation and in their capacities to respond to
it”).
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In domestic institutional settings, these balances are obtained
thanks to two kinds of processes, usually working in parallel. There
can be collective deliberation on who should bear the costs of mischief
and misfortune, i.e., legislation on torts or criminal law. Or there can
be a collective practice of inter-personal claims which—through
time—develops a series of social understandings on the matter, or
precedent. As it is evident, neither of these processes occur in a
vacuum; rather, institutions matter. Collective deliberation needs to
take place in a law-making body for its decisions to actually shape
social practice. And inter-personal claims need to be resolved by a
system of courts for precedent to be relevant. But these institutions do
not exist in a vacuum either: They are themselves grounded in social
norms and responsive to social demands. When people live interde-
pendent lives, as in Benvenisti’s apartment building analogy,268 they
need to resolve how to deal with common problems, and so they tend
to establish appropriate institutions to develop those understandings.
In a sense, community creates jurisdiction, and jurisdiction creates
community.269
In international law, the existing institutions seem to be incapable
of fostering the kind of understandings required to fill the normative
voids of these broad principles.270 The ILC does not have sufficient
legitimacy to make decisions on these complex issues,271 and interna-
tional tribunals have restrictive jurisdictional rules which prevent
them from developing precedent in the matter.272 Former President
Trump’s claims, if taken seriously, can be seen as requesting interna-
tional institutions to develop structures and norms to fill these
voids.273 What the pandemic shows, then, is that a transnational lan-
268 Benvenisti, supra note 14, at 295.
269 See Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV.
843, 844 (1999) (“Territorial jurisdiction produces political and social identities.”).
270 For analyses of the challenges of democratic decisionmaking in international law,
see, for example, Nahuel Maisley, Cohen v. Cohen: Why a Human Right to (Domestic and
Global) Democracy Derives from the Right to Self-Determination , 4 REVISTO
LATINOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFÍA POLÍTICA 1, 28–29 (2015) (arguing that current
interstate decisionmaking is opaque and isolated from constituencies).
271 See, e.g., Fernando Lusa Bordin, Reflections of Customary International Law: The
Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law, 63
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 535, 538 (2014) (“This creates a dilemma for members of the legal
profession committed to rule of law values—while non-legislative codifications contribute
to enhancing the clarity, consistency and congruence of international law, the fact that they
may portray novel rules as reflecting existing law raises legality concerns . . . .”).
272 See Tomuschat, supra note 64, ¶ 42 (explaining that international tribunals are
primarily only empowered to make interim decisions, whose binding effect is uncertain).
273 Our claim here is simply that institutions are needed—we are agnostic about which
institutions are better. See, e.g., Nahuel Maisley, The International Right of Rights? Article
25(a) of the ICCPR as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making, 28 EUR.
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guage allowing us to talk about the costs of our life in common is less
of a utopian project than a practical necessity.274 It is part of the
bumpy road from the world of estates to the world of high-rise apart-
ment buildings.
We come here to a full circle. The lawsuit approach was attractive
to unilateralists because of its promise of a hollow system of justice,
allowing only for minimal, discrete interventions in sovereignty that
did not put countries in the need of extensively discussing their lives in
common. On the road to make a workable compensation claim, how-
ever, we need to rely on mutually shared substantive accounts of what
is valuable in life—what is worth preserving and what is worth
repairing. In the absence of a ready-made, thick global culture to pro-
vide us with these valuations, we need to talk our way through it. The
lawsuit approach, in the end, cannot do without a roundtable. Law,
even in the agonic form of compensation claims, is instrumental to
fostering a conversation that allows for finding a common ground as
to what we all value as humans.275
J. INT’L L. 89 (2017) (arguing for the recognition of a human right to participate in
international lawmaking and for the subsequent establishment of the appropriate
institutions to implement it); Nahuel Maisley, El derecho de la sociedad civil a participar
en la creación del derecho internacional 345–48 (Nov. 14, 2018) (doctoral thesis,
Universidad de Buenos Aires) (on file with Repositorio Institucional CONICET Digital)
(arguing for a global democratic order that is constitutionalist in its principles and pluralist
in its institutions).
274 This idea builds on a Kantian intuition about the nature of our political relations,
which are frequently based on necessity rather than will: “[W]hen you cannot avoid living
side by side with all others, you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them
into a rightful condition . . . .” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 93 (Lara
Denis ed., Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 2017). If this is true, “if we
are, in Kant’s words, ‘unavoidably side by side’ with one another (whatever the historical
reasons for our current proximity), then we have no choice but to attempt to come to terms
with one another in some sort of common framework of law.” Jeremy Waldron, What Is
Cosmopolitan?, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 227, 240 (2000).
275 The idea that contestation over a norm’s meaning has the effect of strengthening the
legitimacy of the norm has been explored in American constitutional law. See Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (offering a model of “democratic constitutionalism” according
to which public contestation over the meaning of the American Constitution can
strengthen the public’s fidelity to it). International relations scholars have also explored
the idea that contestation over a norm’s application has the effect of strengthening the
norm. See Nicole Deitelhoff & Lisbeth Zimmermann, Things We Lost in the Fire: How
Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms, 22 INT’L
STUD. REV. 51, 58 (2020) (“[A]ctors, by engaging in applicatory contestation, support a
norm’s general legitimacy and do not reject the idea that they are bound by a specific
norm.”).
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V
FROM CORRECTIVE JUSTICE TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
So far, we hope to have shown that “wip[ing] out”276 the effects
of the pandemic through a compensatory lawsuit such as the one
envisaged by former President Trump and others entails a series of
prerequisites that might not be apparent at first sight. First, transna-
tional corrective justice necessitates a “public index of goods,”277
transnationally shared, that allows us to know which vicissitudes we
humans consider as costs and which activities we consider worth
risking them. Second, absent a global communitarian culture pro-
viding ready-made answers to those seemingly intractable questions,
we need to construct acceptable shared understandings through dense
interactions, either through global deliberation or through a
continuing practice of intersubjective claims. Third, these interactions
seem to necessitate some (currently non-existent) institutional
settings.
But there is more. If our argument is right, the normative agree-
ments needed for corrective justice have necessary implications for
the discussion of distributive justice. In fact, both types of justice
necessitate each other. Distributive justice is impossible without a
system that somehow protects initial allocations.278 Furthermore, the
very value of those initial shares is partly determined by the level and
type of corrective protection they enjoy.279
There is, however, a deeper conceptual link between the two
types of justice. Corrective justice depends on prior rules that deter-
mine which risks and costs are to be borne by whom. These rules are
essentially distributive.280 In adjudicating that a person is responsible
for harming another one, the judge is saying that the former went
beyond her sphere of legitimate action, and whatever suffering the
latter underwent is for the tortfeasor to bear. Symmetrically, if the
defendant is found not liable for the damage, it becomes for the plain-
tiff to bear just as if it was a brute fact of nature, as if struck by light-
ning. Allocating the costs of these adversities is a deeply political
decision, akin to that made by distributive justice schemes. After all, a
276 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13).
277 Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 196, at 128.
278 Corrective justice, Coleman and Ripstein tell us, “sustain[s] the prevailing
distribution of resources by annulling the effects of certain changes in it.” Id. at 93.
279 Id.
280 See Peter Cane, Distributive Justice and Tort Law, 2001 N.Z. L. REV. 401, 412
(“[M]aking rules that define the grounds and bounds of tort liability is a distributive task,
while applying such rules in individual cases is a corrective task.”).
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 29 Side B      05/11/2021   08:20:10
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet N
o. 29 Side B      05/11/2021   08:20:10
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 54 10-MAY-21 14:59
428 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:375
community might decide that those hit by lightning (or run over by
cars281) are to be compensated by the state, just like those born with
disabilities or in unprivileged households. Note that this statement
does not take a stand towards any particular scheme of distributive
justice, nor about the precise links between distributive and corrective
justice.
Both corrective and distributive justice, in the words of Jules
Coleman and Arthur Ripstein, deal with fundamentally the same
question: how to make people bear the costs of their own activities
and not to impose them on others? In other words, how ought society
allocate the costs arising from mischief and misfortune?282 Misfortune
can arise from fortuitous events or existential luck—from the lack of
natural resources within one’s territory, or from the befall of a pan-
demic upon one’s population. Who is to bear the costs of these adver-
sities is a complex question implying both ways of reasoning about
justice; leaving one aside is reductive and confusing.
The kind of argument brandished by Trump, if taken seriously,
presupposes the existence of a global, shared understanding on how to
deal with mischief and misfortune: how much risk people and commu-
nities are allowed to take (and which activities are worth the risk),
how valuable human lives are, and what acts and omissions people
and states can demand from one another in this regard. All of these
normative judgments have necessary implications in terms of distribu-
tive justice. Whatever standards are agreed upon for the prevention of
zoonotic diseases, they will have costs that will be borne unevenly
across international communities. Countries whose economies depend
more preeminently on their relationship with nature will have a
harder time making their meat production processes safer283 or effec-
tively halting deforestation.284 Communities who rely on wildlife for
281 New Zealand, for example, has famously adopted a government-run compensation
fund for accidents that replaces tort law in many occasions. What We Do, ACCIDENT
COMPENSATION CORP., https://www.acc.co.nz/about-us/who-we-are/what-we-do (last
visited Jan. 9, 2021) (“Everyone in New Zealand is covered by ACC’s no-fault scheme if
they’re injured in an accident.”).
282 Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 196, at 94.
283 Cf. Andrew P. Dobson, Stuart L. Pimm, Lee Hannah, Les Kaufman, Jorge A.
Ahumada, Amy W. Ando, Aaron Bernstein, Jonah Busch, Peter Daszak, Jens Engelmann,
Margaret F. Kinnaird, Binbin V. Li, Ted Loch-Temzelides, Thomas Lovejoy, Katarzyna
Nowak, Patrick R. Roehrdanz & Mariana M. Vale, Ecology and Economics for Pandemic
Prevention, 369 SCIENCE 379, 381 (2020) (“[P]roposals dealing with livestock’s roles in
pandemics are among the most advanced and ambitious of those being seriously
considered.”).
284 Cf. id. at 379 (claiming that deforestation is a key factor in generating virus
transmission from displaced forms of wildlife to humans and livestock and estimating that
“[a]t an annual cost of $9.6 billion, direct forest-protection payments to outcompete
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consumption or commerce, out of culture or of necessity,285 will see
their way of life threatened if they are required to take some forms of
severe zoonosis prevention measures. If American lives are valuable
enough to impose these costs on poorer countries, it will only be
because the international community as a whole finds human lives to
be worth those costs. And if it does, why cannot people in developing
countries demand similar sacrifices from American taxpayers in the
form of humanitarian aid?286
The lawsuit approach, malgré soi, invites these conversations. If
the bonds that link people and states to each other are sufficient to
establish a community for the purpose of corrective justice, with its
corresponding shared valuation of social goods and activities, those
links and valuations are also sufficient to establish a community for
the purpose of (some degree of) distributive justice. By this, we do not
mean to reach a self-standing conclusion on the long-debated issue of
whether (and which kind of) distributive justice is applicable in the
global sphere.287 We are only claiming that the opening of the discus-
sion on corrective justice—which Trump and others are demanding—
necessarily implies the opening of a discussion on distributive justice
as well.
CONCLUSION
At first sight, former President Trump’s lawsuit rhetoric could be
attributed to the vindictive intuitions of a diehard unilateralist. In fact,
some from the left have criticized his approach as a smokescreen dis-
tracting us from the building of a more just global order.288 To locate
the lawsuit approach within the broader international discussion, how-
deforestation economically could achieve a 40% reduction in areas at highest risk for virus
spillover”).
285 See id. at 379 (noting that wildlife markets are a huge risk to global health and noting
that “[t]he United States is one of the biggest global importers of wildlife, including for the
massive exotic pet industry”).
286 For arguments in this direction, see PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD 13 (2002) (“[H]ow
well we come through the era of globalization (perhaps whether we come through it at all)
will depend on how we respond ethically to the idea that we live in one world.”); Charles
R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 360 (1975) (arguing for
substantive obligations of international distributive justice).
287 See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 113, 113
(2005) (“We do not live in a just world. . . . But it is much less clear what, if anything,
justice on a world scale might mean . . . .”). For a review of critiques, see LINARELLI ET AL.,
supra note 74, at 38–77.
288 See, e.g., Bowcott & Giuffrida, supra note 16 (statements of Luis Eslava); see also
Quintana & Uriburu, supra note 20, at 690 (“[T]he professionally oriented approach to
legal thought shifts the focus of legal thinkers away from the task of informing the
conversation about institutional futures, which though possibly less immediate, is surely
more important.”).
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ever, it might be more helpful to contrast it with a more consistent
unilateralism—one that would not trust international law to force
China to internalize the costs of the pandemic. For example, a senior
fellow at the Cato Institute has argued that Trump’s “foolish” idea of
suing China “would set an extraordinarily dangerous precedent”289
that could eventually backfire. The lawsuit approach, building upon
the idea that all sovereigns are equal, is dangerous: “Imagine the rest
of the world ‘making America pay’ for Washington’s mistakes, fail-
ures, and crimes.”290 The logic, hidden in plain sight, is straightfor-
ward: Even the most powerful should tremble when facing the majesty
of law’s empire.291
We hope to have shown that the rhetoric of the lawsuit approach,
even though possibly fostered by a willingness to retreat from multi-
lateralism and its normative commitments, requires the same kind of
thick transnational understandings that were repudiated in the first
place. To some extent, this is a result of the recourse to law, with its
inherent appeal to intersubjective agreements and aspiration to legiti-
macy. Even those distrustful of multilateralism and its institutions,
when placed in the internal perspective of an international lawyer,
need to frame their claims in a manner consistent with a certain nor-
mative understanding of the obligations that subjects owe to each
other. Some might speak the language of law hypocritically, but they
would be underestimating the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”292 The
lawsuit approach, despite Trump’s intentions, leads inexorably to a
conversation about global justice. Perhaps it’s time to take him—at
least this one, exceptional time—seriously.
289 Doug Bandow, Making China Pay Would Cost Americans Dearly, FOREIGN POLICY
(May 5, 2020, 2:59 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/05/trump-pandemic-making-
china-pay.
290 Id.
291 This is, of course, a far-fetched homage to DWORKIN, supra note 193.
292 Elster, supra note 18, at 111.
